UAE versus Emerging Markets: A Risk-Adjusted, Governance-Adjusted Comparison

Why the United Arab Emirates belongs closer to the developed-market end of the risk spectrum than its emerging-market label implies

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ABSTRACT

The United Arab Emirates is conventionally classified and assessed alongside the broad emerging-market complex, and inherits with that label an assumption of high volatility, weak institutions and elevated currency and governance risk. This paper tests that assumption directly by comparing the United Arab Emirates with emerging and developed-market reference groups on a risk-adjusted and governance-adjusted basis, rather than on headline returns alone. Drawing on the literature on emerging-market risk and integration, country governance and institutional quality, and risk-adjusted performance measurement, it advances five propositions concerning where the United Arab Emirates truly sits on the risk spectrum. Using a stylised, clearly-labelled framework, it compares return per unit of risk, decomposes the volatility that distinguishes emerging from developed markets, scores institutional and governance quality, and examines the drawdown and correlation profile of each group. The analysis finds that once currency risk is removed by the dirham peg, governance is scored on its institutional reality rather than its regional label, and returns are measured per unit of risk, the United Arab Emirates ranks materially closer to the developed-market end of the spectrum than to the emerging-market complex with which it is grouped. The paper argues that this mis-classification leads global allocators to overstate the risk of a United Arab Emirates allocation and to under-size it accordingly, and it sets out the implications for classification, benchmarking and portfolio construction, together with the limitations of the analysis and avenues for further research.

JEL Classification: G11, G15, F21, O53, G34

Keywords: United Arab Emirates, emerging markets, risk-adjusted return, governance, institutional quality, market classification, volatility, drawdown

1. INTRODUCTION

Classification is destiny in institutional investing. The category to which a market is assigned determines the benchmark it sits in, the risk assumptions applied to it, the desk that covers it and the lens through which its opportunities and dangers are judged. For the United Arab Emirates, that category has long been "emerging market", and with it has come a bundle of assumptions, high volatility, weak institutions, elevated currency risk and fragile governance, that shape how global capital perceives and prices the country. This paper asks a direct question: when the United Arab Emirates is assessed on the measures that actually matter to an institutional investor, risk-adjusted return, governance quality, drawdown and correlation, rather than on the label it has inherited, where does it truly sit on the risk spectrum?

The question matters because mis-classification is costly. If the United Arab Emirates carries genuinely lower risk than its emerging-market label implies, then an investor who applies emerging-market risk assumptions to it will overstate the risk, under-size the allocation and forgo return and diversification that a correct assessment would capture. Conversely, if the label is accurate, the caution it implies is warranted. The purpose of this paper is to settle the matter empirically in framing terms: to compare the United Arab Emirates with both emerging and developed-market reference groups across the dimensions an institution weighs, and to locate it accurately on the spectrum between them.

The argument develops a theme established in companion analyses, that the dirham's peg to the dollar removes the currency risk that dominates emerging-market return distributions, and that the common-law financial centres provide institutional infrastructure of developed-market quality, and brings it to bear on the specific question of classification. Where those analyses examined the allocation case and the currency mechanism, this paper focuses on the comparative risk profile: it asks not whether the United Arab Emirates deserves an allocation, but whether the risk it carries is being measured correctly in the first place, since every downstream decision depends on that measurement.

The paper makes three contributions. First, it assembles a like-for-like comparison of the United Arab Emirates against emerging and developed-market reference groups on risk-adjusted return, governance, drawdown and correlation, on a stylised and clearly-labelled basis. Second, it decomposes the volatility that separates emerging from developed markets and shows how much of it the United Arab Emirates avoids, principally through the currency peg and institutional quality. Third, it draws out the implications of correcting the classification for benchmarking, risk budgeting and portfolio construction. Throughout, the figures are modelled and labelled; they illustrate relationships and orders of magnitude that an allocator can validate against its own data, and they are not forecasts.

The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on emerging-market risk and integration, governance and institutional quality, and risk-adjusted performance measurement, and develops five propositions. Section 3 sets out the data and the stylised methodology, including the comparative framework and the composite scoring approach. Section 4 presents and discusses the results, covering risk-adjusted return, governance, the decomposition of volatility, drawdown, correlation and a composite ranking. Section 5 reports robustness and a stressed scenario. Section 6 sets out the implications for classification, benchmarking and construction. Section 7 offers concluding comments, including limitations and directions for further research. A statement of disclosures, the references and appendices follow.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND PROPOSITIONS

The analysis draws on three strands of the finance and economics literature: the measurement of risk and return in emerging markets and their integration into global capital markets; the relationship between country governance, institutional quality and investment risk; and the methodology of risk-adjusted performance comparison. This section reviews each and develops the propositions the subsequent analysis examines.

2.1 Emerging-Market Risk and Integration

A long literature documents that emerging markets have historically offered higher returns accompanied by substantially higher volatility than developed markets, and that a large part of that volatility derives from currency instability, political risk and shallow, less liquid markets rather than from the underlying assets alone (Harvey, 1995; Bekaert and Harvey, 1997, 2003). A central finding is that the risk and return characteristics of a market evolve as it integrates with global capital markets, and that the "emerging-market" category is heterogeneous, encompassing economies with very different institutional and currency arrangements (Bekaert and Harvey, 2003). This heterogeneity is the crux of the present paper: a single label applied to a diverse group obscures the fact that some members carry far less of the risk the label implies. The United Arab Emirates, with a pegged currency and developed-market institutional infrastructure, is precisely such an outlier within the category.

2.2 Governance, Institutions and Investment Risk

A substantial body of work links country governance and institutional quality, the rule of law, contract enforcement, property rights and regulatory quality, to investment risk and returns (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, 1998; Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2011). The consistent finding is that strong institutions reduce the risk borne by investors and support higher and more stable valuations, while weak institutions raise the risk premium investors demand. The relevance to classification is direct: if institutional quality, rather than regional label, is what determines this component of risk, then a market with strong institutions should be assessed as carrying lower governance risk regardless of the category to which it is conventionally assigned. The United Arab Emirates, through its common-law financial centres and its broader institutional development, scores on these measures well above the emerging-market average, which the analysis below incorporates explicitly.

2.3 Risk-Adjusted Performance Measurement

The literature on performance measurement establishes that return must be assessed per unit of risk, not in isolation, and provides the apparatus, the Sharpe ratio and its relatives, for doing so (Sharpe, 1966, 1994). The principle is foundational and yet routinely neglected in regional classification, where markets are often grouped by headline return or by convention rather than by their return-to-risk profile. Assessing the United Arab Emirates on a risk-adjusted basis, and in particular netting out the currency risk that inflates emerging-market volatility, is the methodological core of this paper, because it is the comparison that reveals where the country truly sits relative to both reference groups. The literature also cautions that risk-adjusted measures depend on the inputs used, which is why Section 5 tests the sensitivity of the conclusion to the principal assumptions.

2.4 Drawdown and Correlation

Two further dimensions complete the comparison. The drawdown literature emphasises that the worst peak-to-trough loss, rather than ordinary volatility, is what most damages investors and most tests their willingness to hold an allocation, and that tail losses are disproportionately driven in emerging markets by currency collapse and political shock (Longin and Solnik, 2001). Separately, the diversification literature establishes that an asset's value to a portfolio depends on its correlation with the rest of the portfolio, and that lower correlation is more valuable (Markowitz, 1952). A complete comparison of the United Arab Emirates against the reference groups must therefore consider not only return per unit of risk but the drawdown profile and the correlation with global markets, both of which bear on how the allocation would actually behave in a portfolio.

2.5 Synthesis and Propositions

Taken together, these literatures imply that the risk of a market is determined by its currency regime, its institutional quality and its return-to-risk and drawdown profile, not by the category to which convention assigns it, and that the emerging-market label is too heterogeneous to be informative for an outlier such as the United Arab Emirates. From this the paper develops five propositions:

Proposition 1. On a risk-adjusted basis (return per unit of risk), the United Arab Emirates ranks closer to the developed-market reference group than to the emerging-market complex.

Proposition 2. Much of the excess volatility that distinguishes emerging from developed markets derives from currency and governance risk that the United Arab Emirates substantially avoids.

Proposition 3. On governance and institutional-quality measures, the United Arab Emirates scores well above the emerging-market average and approaches the developed-market group.

Proposition 4. The drawdown profile of the United Arab Emirates is closer to the developed-market group than to the emerging-market group, because it lacks the currency-collapse tail.

Proposition 5. A composite of these measures places the United Arab Emirates near the developed-market end of the spectrum, implying that its emerging-market classification overstates its risk.

2.6 The Cost of Mis-Classification

A final, practically important strand of the literature concerns the consequences of classification itself for capital flows and pricing. Because a large share of global institutional capital is allocated against benchmarks, the category and index weight assigned to a market exert a powerful, mechanical influence on the capital it receives, often independent of its fundamentals (MSCI, 2024). A market whose index weight understates its economic significance is structurally under-owned by benchmark-following capital; a market mis-assigned to a high-risk category is assessed with risk assumptions that may not fit. The literature on home bias and on the determinants of cross-border allocation reinforces the point that frictions of categorisation and familiarity, rather than fundamentals, drive much of the variation in who holds what (French and Poterba, 1991). For the United Arab Emirates the implication is that mis-classification is not a cosmetic matter: it translates, through benchmark mechanics and risk assumptions, into a real and persistent under-allocation. This motivates the central empirical task of the paper, which is to establish where the country actually sits so that the cost of mis-classifying it can be recognised and corrected.

2.7 The Limits of a Three-Bucket World

The deeper conceptual issue the United Arab Emirates exposes is the inadequacy of the conventional three-bucket taxonomy, developed, emerging and frontier, into which global markets are sorted. These categories were devised to summarise broad differences in development, liquidity and accessibility, and for many markets they serve well enough. But they were not designed to accommodate a market that has acquired the currency arrangements and institutional infrastructure of a developed market while retaining the growth profile and market depth of an emerging one. Such a market falls between the buckets, and the convention resolves the ambiguity by defaulting to the lower category, importing assumptions that no longer fit. The classification literature recognises that these categories are conventions rather than natural kinds, and that their boundaries are contested and periodically revised (MSCI, 2024). The United Arab Emirates is a case where the convention has not kept pace with the reality, and where the cost of the lag falls on investors who price the country by its bucket rather than its characteristics. The remedy this paper proposes, assessing the market on its measured features, is in effect a call to look through the bucket to the underlying profile, which is what a rigorous risk assessment should do in any case.

3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY

This study is analytical and comparative rather than econometric. Its aim is to make transparent where the United Arab Emirates sits on the risk spectrum relative to emerging and developed-market reference groups, using a framework whose assumptions are stated explicitly rather than estimated from a single proprietary dataset. The figures are stylised and clearly labelled; they illustrate relationships and orders of magnitude an allocator can validate against live data, and they are not forecasts.

3.1 Reference Groups and Data

The analysis compares three groups: the United Arab Emirates (with the wider Gulf where relevant), a broad emerging-market composite, and a developed-market composite. The qualitative inputs, governance and institutional characteristics, are informed by the established cross-country governance literature and indicators (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2011; La Porta et al., 1998). The quantitative inputs, indicative returns, volatilities, drawdowns and correlations for each group, are calibrations informed by the emerging-market and performance literatures (Bekaert and Harvey, 2003; Sharpe, 1994) and by the behaviour of the relevant markets; they are representative rather than precise estimates, and Appendix A records the base-case assumptions.

3.2 Comparative and Composite Framework

The methodology has two components. The first is a dimension-by-dimension comparison of the three groups on risk-adjusted return, governance, the decomposition of volatility, drawdown and correlation, each presented and discussed in Section 4. The second is a composite scoring framework that combines these dimensions into a single risk-adjusted score for each group, in order to test Proposition 5 and to express, in one figure, where the United Arab Emirates sits relative to the reference groups. The composite is deliberately simple and transparent, equal-weighted across the dimensions unless otherwise stated, and its sensitivity to the weighting and to the principal assumptions is examined in Section 5. The base-case assumptions are set out in Table 1.

Table 1. Base-Case Assumptions for the Comparison

Dimension	United Arab Emirates	Emerging markets	Developed markets
Expected net return (% p.a.)	9.2	8.5	6.8
Volatility (% p.a.)	11.0	18.5	13.0

Currency risk vs USD	Low (pegged)	High	Low
Governance score (1 best, 5 worst)	~1.6	~4.2	~1.2
Worst drawdown (%)	~22	~46	~28
Correlation with global equities	~0.42	~0.62	~0.85

Indicative, forward-looking assumptions used to illustrate the analysis; not forecasts. See Appendix A.

4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

This section presents the results in the order of the propositions: risk-adjusted return (Proposition 1); the decomposition of volatility (Proposition 2); governance (Proposition 3); drawdown (Proposition 4); correlation; and the composite ranking (Proposition 5).

4.1 Risk-Adjusted Return

The first and most important comparison is return per unit of risk, reported in Figure 1.

Figure 1. Risk-Adjusted Return: United Arab Emirates versus Emerging and Developed Markets



Indicative excess return, volatility and return-to-risk ratio; modelled on the assumptions in Table 1.

The result supports Proposition 1. The United Arab Emirates offers an excess return above the developed-market group, consistent with a growth and private-markets premium, but at a volatility below the emerging-market group, because the currency peg removes the largest source of emerging-market volatility and the sovereign backstop dampens the cycle. The consequence is a return-to-risk ratio that exceeds both reference groups in the base case and, critically, sits closer to the developed-market profile in character than to the emerging-market one. An allocator that ranks markets by headline return alone, or that applies emerging-market volatility to the United Arab Emirates, will misjudge this: the country's appeal lies precisely in the combination of a growth-market return with a volatility closer to the developed world, which is visible only when return is assessed per unit of risk.

4.2 Decomposing the Volatility

Why is the United Arab Emirates' volatility so much lower than the emerging-market group's? Figure 2 decomposes the excess volatility that distinguishes emerging from developed markets into its sources.

Figure 2. Sources of Emerging-Market Excess Volatility the United Arab Emirates Reduces



Indicative decomposition of the volatility gap between emerging and developed markets.

The decomposition supports Proposition 2. The largest single component of the excess volatility that distinguishes emerging from developed markets is currency, followed by political and governance risk, with liquidity and pure asset risk contributing less. The United Arab Emirates substantially reduces the two largest components: the currency component through the dollar peg, and the governance component through its institutional quality and the common-law financial centres. What remains, liquidity and asset risk, is real but modest, and is the genuine residual risk an investor in the United Arab Emirates bears. The implication is that the country's lower volatility is not an accident of a calm period but a structural consequence of removing the specific risks that make emerging markets volatile, which is why it should be expected to persist rather than to revert to the emerging-market norm.

Figure 3. Where the Return Goes: Asset Return versus Currency Effect



Indicative; an equal asset return delivers a far higher net USD return where there is no currency drag.

Figure 3 reinforces the point from the return side. Two markets earning a similar asset return deliver very different net returns to a dollar-based investor once the currency effect is applied: the emerging-market return surrenders a large slice to currency depreciation, while the United Arab Emirates return, with no drag, arrives substantially intact. This is the return-side counterpart to the volatility decomposition, and together they explain why the United Arab Emirates achieves a developed-market-like risk profile while retaining a growth-market return: the currency regime works in its favour on both the risk and the return dimensions simultaneously.

4.4 Governance and Institutional Quality

The third dimension is governance, where the emerging-market label carries its heaviest and least examined assumption. Figure 4 scores the three groups across the institutional measures the literature links to investment risk.

Figure 4. Governance Scorecard



Indicative scores (1 = strongest, 5 = weakest) across institutional dimensions; lower is better.

The scorecard supports Proposition 3. On the rule of law, contract enforcement, property rights, regulatory quality and currency stability, the United Arab Emirates scores well above the emerging-market composite and approaches the developed-market group, a result driven by the common-law financial centres, the maturity of the regulatory framework and the currency peg. This matters because the governance literature establishes that institutional quality, not regional label, determines this component of risk (La Porta et al., 1998; Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2011); an investor who applies an emerging-market governance assumption to the United Arab Emirates is therefore mis-pricing a risk that the country's institutions have largely addressed. The governance result is also the most consequential for classification, because it is the dimension on which the emerging-market label is most often justified, and on which, for the United Arab Emirates, it is least accurate.

It is important to be precise about what the governance score does and does not claim. It assesses the institutional infrastructure relevant to an international investor, the enforceability of contracts, the protection of property and capital, the quality of regulation and the stability of the currency, on which the United Arab Emirates scores strongly, particularly within its financial centres. It does not make a broader political claim, and an investor should form its own view on dimensions beyond the investment-governance measures considered here. But on the measures that determine the risk borne by an allocator, the evidence is that the United Arab Emirates belongs far closer to the developed-market group than its category implies, and that the governance premium an investor would demand of a typical emerging market is, in large part, not warranted here.

4.5 The Drawdown Profile

Volatility understates the danger that most tests an investor: the worst peak-to-trough loss. Figure 5 compares the maximum drawdown of each group.

Figure 5. Maximum Drawdown by Market Group



Indicative worst peak-to-trough loss; the United Arab Emirates lacks the currency-collapse tail of the EM group.

The drawdown comparison supports Proposition 4. The United Arab Emirates' worst drawdown is closer to the developed-market group than to the emerging-market group, and is in fact modelled below the developed-market figure in the base case, because it lacks the currency-collapse component that drives the deepest emerging-market drawdowns. This is the tail-risk counterpart to the volatility decomposition: the same removal of currency and governance risk that lowers ordinary volatility also removes the extreme losses that do the greatest damage and most test an investor's willingness to hold an allocation through stress. For an institution that judges an allocation partly by how it behaves at its worst, this is among the most important results, because tail behaviour, more than average volatility, is what determines whether an allocation is held or abandoned at the bottom.

4.6 Correlation with Global Markets

A complete comparison must also consider how each group behaves within a portfolio, which depends on its correlation with global markets. Figure 6 reports the correlation of each group with global equities.

Figure 6. Correlation with Global Markets



Indicative correlation with global equities; lower correlation is more valuable in a portfolio.

Here the United Arab Emirates displays a feature that distinguishes it favourably from both reference groups: a correlation with global equities lower than that of the developed-market group and, in the base case, lower than the emerging-market group as well, because its returns are driven substantially by regional factors. This is a result the simple risk-spectrum framing does not capture, and it adds an important qualification to the paper's thesis. The United Arab Emirates resembles a developed market in its risk-adjusted return, governance and drawdown, but it offers a diversification benefit superior to a developed market, because its returns are less tied to the global cycle. In portfolio terms, this is the best of both: developed-market-like risk characteristics with emerging-market-like diversification value, a combination that the conventional classification, which lumps it with the broad emerging-market group, entirely obscures.

4.7 The Composite Ranking

Combining the dimensions into a single composite score, Figure 7 reports where each group sits on an overall risk-adjusted basis.

Figure 7. Composite: the United Arab Emirates Ranks Closer to Developed Markets



Indicative equal-weighted composite of the risk-adjusted dimensions; higher is better.

The composite supports Proposition 5. Combining risk-adjusted return, governance, drawdown and correlation, the United Arab Emirates ranks near the developed-market end of the spectrum and well above the emerging-market group, and in the base case scores highest of the three once its superior diversification is included. The central conclusion of the paper follows: the emerging-market classification overstates the risk of the United Arab Emirates, and an investor who relies on that classification will assess the country as riskier than it is. The composite is, of course, sensitive to its inputs and weightings, which Section 5 examines, but the direction of the result is robust across reasonable variations, because it rests on structural features, the peg and the institutional infrastructure, rather than on a single fragile assumption.

4.8 Liquidity and Market Depth: the Genuine Residual Risk

Having shown how much of the emerging-market risk profile the United Arab Emirates avoids, intellectual honesty requires identifying the risk it genuinely retains. The volatility decomposition isolated liquidity and asset risk as the residual once currency and governance are removed, and liquidity is the more important of the two. The region's public and private markets, while deepening rapidly, remain smaller and less liquid than those of the largest developed markets, which means that exit can be slower and more price-sensitive, particularly in private assets and in stressed conditions. This is a real risk and the paper does not minimise it; it is the principal reason the United Arab Emirates is not simply a developed market on every dimension. The appropriate response is not to abandon the allocation but to recognise that the residual risk is liquidity rather than currency or governance, and to manage it accordingly, by sizing the allocation to a genuine long horizon, maintaining a liquidity reserve, and favouring structures and managers that respect the depth of the underlying market. Framed correctly, the residual risk is one an institutional investor with a long horizon is well placed to bear and to be compensated for, which is a very different proposition from the broad, currency-and-governance-driven risk the emerging-market label implies.

4.9 The United Arab Emirates as a Within-Category Outlier

A recurring theme of the comparison is that the emerging-market category is heterogeneous, and that the United Arab Emirates is an outlier within it (Bekaert and Harvey, 2003). This observation is worth drawing out, because it explains why the classification persists despite the evidence against it. Categories are useful precisely because they summarise; they group markets that share enough characteristics to be assessed together. The difficulty arises when a category contains members whose characteristics diverge sharply from the average, as the United Arab Emirates does on currency regime and governance. The average behaviour of the emerging-market group, which the label invokes, simply does not describe the United Arab Emirates, any more than the average behaviour of a diverse index describes its largest constituent. Recognising the country as an outlier rather than a representative member is the conceptual key to the paper: it is not that the emerging-market label is always wrong, but that it is wrong for this member, and that assessing the member on the category average mis-prices it. The same logic would apply to any market that has acquired developed-market institutional and currency arrangements while retaining an emerging-market growth profile, a small but important set of which the United Arab Emirates is a leading example.

4.10 Real Returns and the Inflation Dimension

A dimension that compounds the currency advantage concerns real, inflation-adjusted returns. Emerging-market currency depreciation frequently accompanies higher domestic inflation, so the investor suffers a double erosion of real value: the currency loss and the inflation behind it. By importing the monetary discipline of the dollar bloc through the peg, the United Arab Emirates tends to deliver inflation outcomes closer to those of the developed world than to those of high-inflation floating economies, so that the real return an investor earns is less likely to be undermined by a domestic inflation-and-depreciation spiral. This does not make the country immune to inflation, periods of strong local demand can raise prices, but it does mean that the corrosive combination that destroys real returns in the weakest emerging markets is structurally less likely. For a long-horizon investor whose objective is the preservation and growth of real wealth, this real-return stability is a further respect in which the United Arab Emirates behaves more like a developed than an emerging market, and it reinforces the risk-adjusted conclusion when returns are measured in real rather than nominal terms.

4.11 The Diversification Result in Portfolio Context

The correlation finding of Section 4.6 deserves fuller treatment, because it is the result that most distinguishes the United Arab Emirates from a simple "low-risk emerging market" and gives it a distinctive role in a global portfolio. A market can have attractive standalone risk-adjusted characteristics and yet add little to a portfolio if it moves in lockstep with assets the investor already holds; conversely, a market with ordinary standalone characteristics can be highly valuable if it moves independently. The United Arab Emirates combines both virtues: developed-market-like standalone risk characteristics and a correlation with global equities below that of developed markets. In portfolio terms this means a United Arab Emirates allocation does double duty, contributing a solid risk-adjusted return while also lowering the variance of the overall portfolio through diversification. The diversification literature establishes that this combination is more valuable than either characteristic alone (Markowitz, 1952), and it is precisely the combination that the emerging-market classification obscures by grouping the country with markets whose higher correlation and higher risk give them a quite different portfolio role. An investor assessing the United Arab Emirates only on standalone risk, without crediting its diversification, still understates its value.

This portfolio perspective also sharpens the cost of mis-classification. An institution that under-allocates to the United Arab Emirates because it over-prices the standalone risk forgoes not only the risk-adjusted return but the diversification benefit, a double loss that compounds over the long horizons institutions invest across. The correction therefore improves the portfolio on two dimensions at once, which is why the reclassification argued for in this paper is not a marginal refinement but a change with material consequences for portfolio efficiency.

4.12 Comparability and the Choice of Reference Groups

A methodological question bears on the interpretation of the results: how sensitive is the comparison to the composition of the reference groups? Both the emerging and developed-market composites are themselves heterogeneous, and a different selection of constituents would shift their average characteristics somewhat. Two safeguards limit the concern. First, the comparison is constructed on the dimensions that are least sensitive to composition, broad differences in currency regime, governance and volatility that distinguish the groups robustly regardless of the precise constituents, rather than on fine return differences that would be composition-dependent. Second, the conclusion is about direction and approximate position, that the United Arab Emirates sits closer to the developed-market end than to the emerging-market end, rather than about a precise score, and the direction is stable across reasonable choices of reference group because it rests on structural features of the United Arab Emirates itself, not on the exact comparators. The sensitivity analysis of Section 5.1 confirms that no single assumption returns the country to the emerging-market profile, and the same robustness applies to the choice of reference group: the result is a statement about the United Arab Emirates more than about the precise composites against which it is measured. An investor reproducing the analysis with its own preferred comparators should expect the same qualitative conclusion.

4.13 Why the Mis-Classification Persists

If the evidence that the United Arab Emirates is mis-classified is as clear as this paper argues, it is reasonable to ask why the classification persists. Several reinforcing reasons explain the inertia. Categories are sticky by design, because changing them imposes costs on index providers, benchmark-followers and the institutions whose mandates and coverage are built around them, so the bar for reclassification is high and the process slow. Familiarity and habit compound the stickiness: allocators who have always treated the Gulf as an emerging market carry that assumption forward without re-examining it, exactly the behavioural pattern the home-bias literature documents (French and Poterba, 1991). And the heterogeneity of the emerging-market category means an outlier can sit within it for a long time without forcing a re-evaluation, because the category was never expected to be homogeneous in the first place. None of these reasons is a defence of the classification on the merits; each is an explanation of institutional inertia. For the individual investor, the practical significance is that the mis-classification, and therefore the opportunity it creates, is likely to persist for some time, because the forces that would correct it operate slowly. This is the same early-mover logic that recurs throughout the analysis: the investor who corrects the assessment ahead of the consensus captures the benefit before the broader correction arrives.

4.14 Reading the Composite with Appropriate Caution

The composite score of Figure 7 is a useful summary, but it should be read with appropriate caution, and stating its limits strengthens rather than weakens the conclusion. A composite necessarily compresses multiple dimensions into one number and so discards information; it depends on the weighting chosen; and it can create a false impression of precision. For these reasons the composite is presented here as a summary of the dimension-by-dimension analysis rather than as a standalone verdict, and the underlying components, risk-adjusted return, governance, drawdown and correlation, are reported individually so that a reader can weigh them according to its own priorities. The robustness of the conclusion does not rest on the composite but on the consistency of the individual dimensions: the United Arab Emirates ranks closer to the developed-market group on each of them separately, not merely in their combination. An investor sceptical of composites can therefore disregard Figure 7 entirely and still reach the paper's conclusion from the component results, which is the stronger form of the argument. The composite adds convenience, not the substance of the case, and the case stands on the individual measures whether or not one trusts their combination.

5. ROBUSTNESS AND SCENARIO ANALYSIS

A disciplined analysis must test the conclusion against its key assumptions and against a stressed scenario. This section reports a sensitivity analysis and a scenario in which the structural supports of the result are placed under pressure.

5.1 Sensitivity to Assumptions and Weighting

Figure 8 reports the sensitivity of the composite conclusion to the principal assumptions, each varied around the base case.

Figure 8. Sensitivity of the Risk-Adjusted Conclusion



Each bar shows the swing in the composite score from varying one assumption around the base case.

The currency assumption and the return premium move the result most, which aligns with the analysis: the United Arab Emirates' favourable profile rests on the removal of currency risk and on a genuine but moderate return premium. The governance weighting and the drawdown and correlation estimates matter but are secondary. Critically, across the full range of reasonable variations the United Arab Emirates remains closer to the developed-market group than to the emerging-market group; no plausible single assumption returns it to the emerging-market profile. This robustness is the natural consequence of the result resting on several structural features at once rather than on a single input, and it is what gives the classification conclusion its force.

5.2 The Stressed Scenario

The scenario that would most threaten the conclusion is one in which the structural supports weaken simultaneously: a prolonged hydrocarbon downturn that strained the fiscal position and, in the extreme, pressured the peg, combined with a global stress in which correlations rose. Under such a scenario the United Arab Emirates' volatility and drawdown would increase and its diversification benefit would attenuate, narrowing the gap with the emerging-market group. Two points temper this. First, the same sovereign resources that support the peg also cushion the fiscal position, so the scenario is less likely and less severe for the United Arab Emirates than for a typical emerging market lacking those buffers. Second, even under the stress the governance and institutional advantages, which are structural and not cyclical, persist, so the country does not revert fully to the emerging-market profile. The honest conclusion is that the result is robust in the central case and degrades partially, not completely, under severe stress, which is the appropriate characterisation of any classification claim that rests on structural features.

5.3 Stability of the Result Across Regimes

A natural question is whether the favourable comparison is an artefact of a particular market regime or holds across different conditions. The structural basis of the result, the currency peg and the institutional infrastructure, is regime-independent: it does not depend on a bull market or a benign global environment, but on features that are present in good times and bad. This distinguishes the United Arab Emirates' low-risk profile from the spurious low volatility a market can display during a quiet period that then reverts in stress. Because the peg and the institutions operate continuously, the volatility and drawdown advantages they produce should likewise persist across regimes, attenuating but not reversing under stress, as Section 5.2 discussed. The implication for the investor is that the corrected classification is not a fair-weather conclusion to be revised at the first sign of volatility, but a structural assessment that should be expected to hold, which is what makes it a sound basis for a long-term allocation rather than a tactical view.

5.4 What Would Change the Conclusion

Sound analysis specifies the conditions under which its conclusion would no longer hold, and for this paper there are three. The first is a change in the currency regime: were the dollar peg to be abandoned or to break, the largest single source of the United Arab Emirates' volatility advantage would return, and its profile would move toward the emerging-market group; the companion analysis of the peg argues this is unlikely given the supporting fundamentals, but it is the assumption on which most of the result rests. The second is a material deterioration in governance or institutional quality, which would erode the second pillar of the advantage; the trajectory here has been one of improvement rather than deterioration, but it is a dimension to monitor. The third is a sustained rise in the correlation of Gulf assets with global markets as the region integrates further, which would reduce the diversification benefit; the integration literature suggests this is a gradual, long-horizon process rather than an abrupt one (Bekaert and Harvey, 2003). Naming these conditions does two things: it disciplines the conclusion by making it falsifiable, and it tells the investor exactly which indicators to monitor so that the classification can be revisited if the structural basis for it changes. Absent movement in these three, the conclusion stands.

5.5 A Reclassification Checklist

For an institution persuaded by the analysis, the practical task is to translate it into changes in its own processes. The following checklist captures the steps:

- Update risk-system parameters for the United Arab Emirates to reflect low currency risk, strong governance, moderate volatility and a developed-market-like drawdown, rather than emerging-market defaults.
- Re-benchmark the exposure against an appropriate comparator on a net, currency-adjusted basis, rather than a broad emerging-market index.
- Re-size the allocation against the corrected, lower risk and credit its diversification contribution in the portfolio model.
- Identify liquidity as the genuine residual risk and manage it through horizon, reserves and structure selection.
- Establish monitoring of the three conditions, currency regime, governance and correlation, that would warrant revisiting the classification.

Worked through in sequence, these steps ensure that the institution acts on the measured risk rather than the inherited label, and that it captures the improvement in both return and diversification that the correction reveals.

5.6 The Result in the Context of the Companion Analyses

This paper forms part of a connected body of work on global institutional allocation to the Gulf, and its conclusion is reinforced by the companion analyses. The case for a dedicated allocation establishes that the Gulf is under-owned relative to its economic weight and that a measured sleeve improves a global portfolio; the analysis of the currency peg establishes that the dirham removes the largest emerging-market risk and is durably supported. The present paper supplies the connecting piece: it shows that, once the peg and the institutional infrastructure are taken into account, the United Arab Emirates is mis-classified, and that this mis-classification is the proximate cause of the under-allocation the first analysis documents. The three results are mutually reinforcing. The under-allocation is explained by the mis-classification; the mis-classification is corrected by measuring the country on its true risk; and the true risk is low principally because of the currency peg and the institutions. An allocator persuaded by any one of the three should find the others strengthen the case, because they describe the same underlying reality from different angles, the allocation gap, the currency mechanism and the risk classification, and converge on the same practical conclusion: the United Arab Emirates merits a more accurate assessment and, on that assessment, a larger allocation than convention currently affords it.

Viewing the three together also clarifies the sequence in which an institution should act. The classification correction examined here is logically prior, because it determines the risk inputs on which sizing and benchmarking depend; the currency analysis supplies the central justification for that correction; and the allocation case translates the corrected assessment into a portfolio decision. An institution working through the question in that order, first measuring the risk correctly, then understanding why it is low, then sizing the allocation, will reach a sounder decision than one that begins with the allocation question while leaving the inherited classification unexamined.

6. IMPLICATIONS FOR CLASSIFICATION, BENCHMARKING AND CONSTRUCTION

The analysis carries direct implications for how an international investor should treat the United Arab Emirates, and these follow from correcting the classification.

6.1 Classification and Risk Assumptions

The first implication is that the United Arab Emirates should be assessed with risk assumptions reflecting its measured profile, low currency risk, strong governance, moderate volatility and a developed-market-like drawdown, rather than the emerging-market assumptions it inherits by category. An investor whose risk systems apply an emerging-market volatility and governance assumption to the country is overstating its risk, with consequences that propagate through every downstream decision. Correcting the input is a low-cost change that materially improves the assessed risk-adjusted attractiveness of the allocation.

6.2 Benchmarking

The second implication concerns benchmarking. Because a large share of institutional capital is benchmark-driven, the placement of the United Arab Emirates within a broad emerging-market benchmark, at a weight that understates its economic significance and surrounded by markets of very different risk character, both under-allocates to it and mis-frames it. An investor that benchmarks the country against the broad emerging-market group is measuring its managers and its allocation against an inappropriate comparator. A more accurate approach treats the United Arab Emirates as a distinct exposure with its own risk character, benchmarked on a net, currency-adjusted basis, rather than folding it into a category whose average behaviour it does not share.

6.3 Portfolio Construction and Risk Budgeting

The third implication concerns construction and risk budgeting. Because the United Arab Emirates carries lower risk than its label implies and offers superior diversification, it consumes less of an institution's risk budget than an emerging-market allocation of the same size while contributing more diversification. This makes it an unusually efficient consumer of scarce risk capacity, and an institution that books it at an inflated emerging-market risk level will under-allocate not only to the country but, through the risk budget, distort the wider portfolio. Sizing the allocation against its true, lower risk permits a more accurate and generally larger allocation, and captures the diversification benefit that the correlation result identified.

6.4 Expressing the Corrected View in Practice

Translating the corrected classification into practice involves a small number of concrete steps. The institution should record the United Arab Emirates in its risk systems with parameters reflecting its measured profile, low currency risk, strong governance, moderate volatility and a developed-market-like drawdown, rather than emerging-market defaults. It should benchmark the exposure against an appropriate comparator that reflects its distinct character, on a net, currency-adjusted basis, rather than folding it into a broad emerging-market index whose average behaviour it does not share. It should size the allocation against the corrected, lower risk, recognising both the reduced risk-budget consumption and the superior diversification the correlation result identified. And it should manage the genuine residual risk, liquidity, through horizon, reserves and structure selection. These steps are modest individually, but together they convert the analytical conclusion of the paper into a managed feature of the portfolio and ensure that the institution captures the benefit that an accurate classification reveals.

6.5 Communicating the Reclassification to an Investment Committee

A practical obstacle to acting on the analysis is institutional: investment committees are conditioned to treat the emerging-market label with caution, and reclassifying a market cuts against that conditioning. The most effective way to present the case is to lead not with the label but with the measured evidence, the risk-adjusted return, the volatility decomposition, the governance scores and the drawdown profile, and to let the committee see that the risk it has been pricing is not the risk the country actually carries. Framing the question as one of accurate measurement rather than of advocacy is important, because the aim is not to persuade the committee to like the United Arab Emirates but to ensure that whatever decision it reaches is based on the country's true risk rather than an inherited assumption. A committee that approves or declines an allocation on a mis-specified risk is making a worse decision than one that sees the measured risk, regardless of which way it ultimately decides, and the contribution of a clear comparison is to improve the quality of that decision.

Before turning to the formal conclusions, it is worth restating the practical stake in plain terms. The difference between assessing the United Arab Emirates as an average emerging market and assessing it on its measured profile is not academic: it is the difference between holding little or no exposure and holding a position sized to the country's true risk-adjusted attractiveness and diversification value. For a large institution, that difference is measured in basis points of portfolio return and in the smoothness of the return path, compounded over decades. The case for getting the classification right is, ultimately, a case for measuring risk accurately so that capital is allocated efficiently, which is the core discipline of the institutional investor.

6.6 Implications for Manager Mandates and Coverage

A final, organisational implication concerns how an institution structures the mandates and internal coverage through which it accesses the United Arab Emirates. When the country is filed under emerging markets, it is typically covered by an emerging-market team and accessed through emerging-market mandates, which brings to it the assumptions, benchmarks and risk appetite of that function. If the analysis of this paper is correct, this is a mismatch: the country's risk character and its role in the portfolio differ from those of the broad emerging-market group, and covering it through that lens perpetuates the mis-assessment. Institutions might instead consider treating the United Arab Emirates, and similar between-category markets, as a distinct exposure with dedicated or shared coverage that assesses it on its own characteristics, benchmarks it appropriately, and sizes it against its true risk. This is a larger organisational change than updating a risk parameter, and not every institution will judge it worthwhile for a single country; but recognising that the conventional coverage model embeds the very classification the analysis questions is itself useful, because it explains why the mis-assessment is so persistent and points to where an institution serious about correcting it would need to act.

6.7 A Concluding Perspective for the Allocator

For the allocator, the analysis resolves into a single, actionable insight: assess the United Arab Emirates on what it is, not on what it is called. Everything else follows from that. The risk parameters, the benchmark, the allocation size, the coverage model and the diligence focus all change once the country is measured on its currency regime, its institutions and its return-to-risk and drawdown profile rather than on the average behaviour of the category to which it is conventionally assigned. The change is low-cost, because it requires correcting assumptions rather than acquiring new capability, and high-value, because it improves both the accuracy of the risk assessment and, in general, the allocation and diversification that flow from it. The allocator who makes the correction is not taking a contrarian bet; it is simply measuring risk more accurately than the convention allows, which is the core of the discipline. And because the forces that sustain the mis-classification move slowly, the allocator who corrects it early stands to benefit from both the more accurate assessment and the gradual convergence of the consensus toward it.

6.8 A Note on Generality

Although this paper concerns the United Arab Emirates specifically, its method and much of its conclusion generalise to a small but growing set of markets that occupy the space between the conventional categories. Any market that has acquired a credible currency arrangement and developed-market institutional infrastructure while retaining an emerging-market growth profile and market depth will be mis-described by the emerging-market average, and will reward the investor who assesses it on its measured characteristics rather than its label. The United Arab Emirates is a leading example of this type, but the analytical approach taken here, decomposing the risk that distinguishes the categories, scoring institutional quality on its reality, and measuring return per unit of risk and drawdown, is applicable wherever a market sits awkwardly within its assigned bucket. The broader contribution of the paper, beyond the specific case, is therefore methodological: it offers a template for looking through classification to the underlying risk profile, which is a discipline of general value in a world where categories lag the markets they are meant to describe. As more markets mature into this between-category position, the cost of relying on convention rather than measurement will grow, and the value of the approach demonstrated here will grow with it.

7. CONCLUDING COMMENTS

This paper has tested the conventional classification of the United Arab Emirates as an emerging market by comparing it with emerging and developed-market reference groups on the measures that actually determine the risk an investor bears. The findings are consistent across the propositions. On a risk-adjusted basis the United Arab Emirates ranks closer to the developed-market group than to the emerging-market complex (Proposition 1). Much of the excess volatility that distinguishes emerging from developed markets derives from currency and governance risk that the United Arab Emirates substantially avoids through the dollar peg and its institutional infrastructure (Proposition 2). On governance and institutional quality it scores well above the emerging-market average and approaches the developed-market group (Proposition 3). Its drawdown profile is closer to the developed-market group because it lacks the currency-collapse tail (Proposition 4). And a composite of these measures places it near the developed-market end of the spectrum, with the added feature of superior diversification (Proposition 5).

The implication is that the emerging-market classification overstates the risk of the United Arab Emirates, and that this mis-classification is costly. An investor who applies emerging-market risk assumptions to the country will overstate its volatility, governance and tail risk; will benchmark it against an inappropriate comparator; will size the allocation against an inflated risk figure; and will, in consequence, under-allocate to a market that on its true profile deserves more. Correcting the classification, assessing the United Arab Emirates on its measured risk-adjusted, governance-adjusted reality rather than on its inherited label, is a low-cost change that improves both the accuracy of the risk assessment and, generally, the allocation that follows from it.

The deeper lesson concerns classification itself. The case of the United Arab Emirates illustrates how a single category, applied to a heterogeneous group, can carry assumptions that do not hold for its outliers, and how the uncritical application of those assumptions leads to systematic mis-pricing. The remedy is to assess each market on the features it actually possesses, its currency regime, its institutions, its return-to-risk and drawdown profile, rather than on the average behaviour of the category to which convention assigns it. For the United Arab Emirates, that assessment reveals a market closer to the developed world in risk than to the emerging world with which it is grouped, and more valuable in a portfolio than either, because it combines developed-market risk characteristics with emerging-market diversification.

The study is subject to limitations that also define its contribution. It is analytical and comparative rather than econometric: its quantitative comparisons rest on representative, clearly-labelled assumptions rather than on estimates from a comprehensive dataset, a choice appropriate to a framing argument but one that trades precision for transparency. The reference groups are composites that themselves contain heterogeneity, and the composite score depends on its weighting, which the sensitivity analysis addresses but does not eliminate. The governance assessment is confined to investment-relevant institutional measures and does not extend to broader considerations on which investors will form their own views. These limitations point to the natural avenues for further research: formal estimation of the risk-adjusted and governance-adjusted profile of the United Arab Emirates against matched comparators; analysis of how that profile has evolved with the development of the financial centres; and study of the appropriate benchmark treatment of markets that, like the United Arab Emirates, sit between the conventional categories. As the data infrastructure of the region's markets matures, the framing argument made here can and should be subjected to formal empirical test. In the meantime, the direction of the evidence is clear, and it favours the investor who assesses the United Arab Emirates on its measured risk rather than on its inherited label.

In sum, the contribution of this paper is to subject a conventional classification to direct, multi-dimensional test, and to show that on the measures that determine the risk an investor bears, the United Arab Emirates sits closer to the developed-market end of the spectrum than to the emerging-market complex with which it is grouped, while offering superior diversification to either. The propositions are framed to be testable, and their formal empirical examination as the region's data matures is the natural next step. For the practitioner, however, the direction of the evidence is already sufficient to warrant correcting the classification, and with it the risk assumptions, benchmarks and allocation sizing that flow from it. The broader point endures beyond this single case: markets should be assessed on the features they actually possess, not on the average behaviour of the category to which convention has assigned them, and the investor who does so will measure risk more accurately, and allocate more wisely, than one who relies on the label.

It bears emphasis, finally, that the argument of this paper is one of measurement rather than advocacy. The claim is not that the United Arab Emirates is a superior market that every investor should rush to own, but that its risk has been mis-measured by the category to which it is conventionally assigned, and that an investor weighing it, whatever conclusion they reach, should do so on its measured risk-adjusted, governance-adjusted profile rather than on an inherited label. On that measured basis the country sits closer to the developed-market end of the spectrum and offers superior diversification, and an investor who prices it accordingly will make a better-informed decision than one who relies on the emerging-market classification. That improvement in the quality of the decision, available at the low cost of correcting an assumption, is the practical contribution this paper seeks to make.

To close, the significance of the question this paper addresses extends beyond a single country to the practice of risk measurement itself. Institutional investors devote great care to estimating the risk of individual securities and strategies, yet often accept, without comparable scrutiny, the risk assumptions that come bundled with a market's category. The case of the United Arab Emirates shows how consequential that asymmetry can be: a single inherited label carries assumptions about currency, governance and volatility that, on examination, do not hold, and the uncritical acceptance of those assumptions leads to systematic mis-pricing and under-allocation. The remedy is neither complex nor costly. It is to extend to classification the same scrutiny an investor already applies to securities, to ask whether the risk the category implies is the risk the market actually carries. For the United Arab Emirates the answer is that it is not, and that the country sits closer to the developed-market end of the spectrum, with superior diversification, than its emerging-market label suggests. An investor who internalises that finding will not only assess the Gulf more accurately but will be better equipped to recognise the next market that, having matured beyond its category, is waiting to be measured on what it has become rather than on what it was once called.

DISCLOSURES

The author is an independent researcher and transaction advisor who advises institutional and family-office investors on matters including capital allocation and structuring related to the markets discussed in this paper, and may have professional or commercial interests in transactions involving the Gulf region. This paper is provided for information and educational purposes only; it does not constitute investment, tax or legal advice, an offer or solicitation, or a recommendation to buy or sell any security or strategy. The figures presented are modelled and illustrative, are not forecasts, and should be independently verified. Comparative and governance assessments are simplified for analytical purposes and reflect investment-relevant measures only. Readers should obtain advice appropriate to their own circumstances and jurisdiction before acting.

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About the Author

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APPENDIX A. BASE-CASE ASSUMPTIONS

Table 2. Full Parameter Set for the Comparison

Parameter	UAE	Emerging	Developed
Expected net return (% p.a.)	9.2	8.5	6.8
Volatility (% p.a.)	11.0	18.5	13.0
Excess return over cash (% p.a.)	6.2	5.5	3.8
Return-to-risk ratio	0.56	0.30	0.29
Governance score (1 best, 5 worst)	1.6	4.2	1.2
Worst drawdown (%)	22	46	28
Correlation with global equities	0.42	0.62	0.85
Composite score (0-10)	7.8	5.1	7.2

Indicative, forward-looking assumptions used to illustrate the analysis; not forecasts.

APPENDIX B. GLOSSARY

The following terms are used in this paper. Definitions are provided for the general reader and are not intended as formal definitions.

Composite score A single figure combining several risk-adjusted dimensions (return per risk, governance, drawdown, correlation) into one comparable measure.

Correlation A measure between minus one and plus one of how closely two assets' returns move together; lower correlation adds more diversification.

Currency peg A policy fixing a currency's value to another; the UAE dirham is pegged to the US dollar, removing currency volatility.

Developed markets The most advanced, liquid and institutionally mature markets, typically lower-return and lower-volatility than emerging markets.

Drawdown The peak-to-trough decline in value; the maximum drawdown is the worst such loss and a key measure of tail risk.

Emerging markets A heterogeneous category of economies integrating with global capital markets, typically higher-return and higher-volatility.

Excess return Return above the risk-free rate (cash); the numerator of risk-adjusted performance measures.

Governance / institutional quality The strength of the rule of law, contract enforcement, property rights and regulation that protect investors and reduce risk.

Home-currency return An investor's return measured in its own currency, after the currency effect.

Integration (market) The degree to which a market is incorporated into global capital markets; integration tends to change its risk and return characteristics.

Market classification The assignment of a market to a category (developed, emerging, frontier) by index providers, which strongly influences capital flows.

Return-to-risk ratio A measure of return earned per unit of risk, in the family of the Sharpe ratio; higher is better.

Risk budget The total risk an institution is willing to bear, allocated across holdings; lower-risk allocations consume less of it.

Risk premium The additional expected return investors demand for bearing a particular risk.

Sharpe ratio Excess return divided by volatility; a standard measure of risk-adjusted performance.

Sovereign backstop The capacity of a state with strong balance sheets to cushion economic shocks, dampening market volatility.

Tail risk The risk of rare but severe losses, often driven in emerging markets by currency collapse or political shock.

Volatility The degree of variation in returns over time, commonly measured by standard deviation and used as a proxy for risk.

Worldwide Governance Indicators A widely used set of cross-country measures of governance quality used in the institutional-quality literature.

Benchmark mechanics The way index weights and category membership channel benchmark-following capital toward or away from a market, often independent of fundamentals.

Heterogeneity Variation among the members of a category; high heterogeneity makes the category average a poor description of an individual member.

Outlier A member of a category whose characteristics diverge sharply from the category average, as the UAE does within emerging markets.

Real return Return after adjusting for inflation; the true measure of preserved purchasing power.

Residual risk The risk that remains after the principal identifiable risks (here currency and governance) have been removed; for the UAE, principally liquidity.

Frontier markets The least developed and least liquid investable markets, a tier below emerging markets in the conventional taxonomy.

Reference group A comparator set (here emerging or developed-market composites) against which a market is assessed.

Reclassification A change in the category to which a market is assigned, which alters its benchmark treatment, risk assumptions and capital flows.

Standalone risk The risk of an asset considered in isolation, as distinct from its contribution to portfolio risk after diversification.