A First-Time Gulf Allocation: An Institutional Due-Diligence Framework

A structured diligence path for the institution making its first allocation to the United Arab Emirates and the wider Gulf

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ABSTRACT

The decision to make a first allocation to an unfamiliar region is as much a test of process as of conviction, and the quality of the due diligence that precedes it does more to determine the outcome than the merits of the opportunity alone. This paper sets out a structured due-diligence framework for an institution, a pension, insurer, endowment or fund-of-funds, making its first allocation to the United Arab Emirates and the wider Gulf. Drawing on the literature on institutional investment process, manager selection and operational due diligence, and on the governance and risk research relevant to a new market, it advances five propositions concerning what distinguishes effective from ineffective first-allocation diligence. Using a stylised, clearly-labelled framework, it sets out the six phases of a first-allocation programme, strategy and sizing, market and risk assessment, manager selection, operational due diligence, structuring and legal, and monitoring, and it quantifies, on an illustrative basis, how diligence maturity relates to expected outcome and downside risk. The analysis finds that the largest, most controllable determinant of first-allocation success is the quality and consistency of the process, that manager selection and operational diligence carry disproportionate weight in a younger market, and that the most common failures stem from rushing the process rather than from the region itself. The paper provides a phased timeline, a manager-selection scorecard, a risk matrix and a diligence checklist, and it discusses the limitations of the framework and avenues for further research.

JEL Classification: G11, G23, G24, G34, O53

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1. INTRODUCTION

When an institution allocates capital to a market it knows well, process and conviction reinforce one another, and the diligence that precedes the decision is, in a sense, confirmatory. When it allocates for the first time to a region it does not know, the relationship reverses: conviction is thin, the familiar shortcuts are unavailable, and the quality of the due-diligence process becomes the principal safeguard against error. A first allocation to an unfamiliar region is therefore best understood as a test of process, and the institution that approaches it with a structured, disciplined diligence framework will, on the evidence assembled here, achieve materially better outcomes than one that relies on relationship, instinct or haste.

This paper sets out such a framework for the specific case of a first institutional allocation to the United Arab Emirates and the wider Gulf. It is written for the chief investment officer, the head of alternatives and the investment committee that have accepted, perhaps on the strength of the broader case for a Gulf allocation, that the region warrants a first commitment, and that now face the practical question of how to diligence and execute it well. Its purpose is not to re-argue the case for allocating, which companion analyses address, but to provide the structured path from decision to deployment that converts a strategic intention into a sound first programme.

The argument rests on a simple but consequential premise: that in a first allocation to a younger and less familiar market, the diligence process is the largest controllable determinant of the outcome. The opportunity set, the macro environment and the currency regime are given; what the institution controls is how rigorously it assesses them, how well it selects managers, how thoroughly it conducts operational diligence, and how disciplined it is in structuring, sizing and pacing. Because these are precisely the dimensions a structured framework addresses, the quality of the framework, and the consistency with which it is applied, becomes the institution's main lever on the result.

The paper makes three contributions. First, it sets out the six phases of a first-allocation diligence programme and shows where diligence effort should be concentrated, arguing that manager selection and operational diligence carry disproportionate weight in a younger market. Second, it relates diligence maturity to outcome and downside risk on an illustrative basis, making explicit the cost of rushing the process. Third, it provides the practical tools, a phased timeline, a manager-selection scorecard, a risk matrix and a diligence checklist, that an institution can apply directly. Throughout, the figures are modelled and clearly labelled; they illustrate relationships and orders of magnitude rather than forecasts.

The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on institutional investment process, manager selection and operational due diligence, and develops five propositions. Section 3 describes the data and the stylised methodology, including the phased framework and the maturity assessment. Section 4 presents and discusses the results, covering the allocation of diligence effort, the risk matrix, access routes, the timeline, the manager scorecard and the relationship between diligence maturity and outcome. Section 5 reports robustness and a stressed scenario. Section 6 sets out implementation considerations. Section 7 offers concluding comments, including limitations and directions for further research. A statement of disclosures, the references and appendices follow.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND PROPOSITIONS

The framework draws on three strands of the literature: the research on institutional investment process and governance; the literature on manager selection in private markets; and the literature on operational due diligence and the non-investment risks that cause many institutional losses. This section reviews each and develops the propositions the analysis examines.

2.1 Institutional Investment Process and Governance

A substantial literature links the quality of an institution's investment process and governance to its realised returns, finding that disciplined, well-governed institutions outperform those whose decisions are ad hoc or politicised (Swensen, 2009; Clark and Urwin, 2008). The consistent theme is that process, the consistency, rigour and independence of how decisions are made, is itself a source of return, and that its absence is a source of avoidable loss. For a first allocation to an unfamiliar region, where the discipline of a familiar process is most needed and most easily abandoned, this finding is directly relevant: the institution that applies a structured framework imposes on an unfamiliar decision the same rigour it would bring to a familiar one, which is precisely what an unfamiliar decision requires.

2.2 Manager Selection in Private Markets

Because a first Gulf allocation is typically expressed through managers, the literature on manager selection is central. The evidence in private markets is that the dispersion between the best and worst managers is wide and, unlike in public markets, persistent, so that the selection of managers is the single largest driver of realised outcomes (Kaplan and Schoar, 2005; Harris, Jenkinson and Kaplan, 2014). The corollary is that diligence effort is well spent on selection, and that in a younger market, where track records are shorter and the manager base less established, selection is both harder and more important. The literature also establishes which attributes predict persistence, team quality, a genuine edge, a repeatable process and aligned terms, which informs the scorecard developed in Section 4.

2.3 Operational Due Diligence

A distinct literature, and a hard-won body of practitioner experience, establishes that a large share of institutional losses in alternative investments stem not from poor investment decisions but from operational failures and, in the worst cases, fraud, that proper operational due diligence would have surfaced (Brown, Goetzmann, Liang and Schwarz, 2008, 2012). The finding is that operational diligence, the independent assessment of a manager’s administration, valuation, custody, compliance and governance, is not a formality but a primary safeguard, and that its importance rises where operational maturity cannot be assumed. In a younger market this caution applies with particular force, which is why the framework treats operational diligence as a weighted phase and a gate rather than a box-ticking exercise.

2.4 Diligence, Pacing and the First Allocation

A final strand concerns the specific character of a first allocation as both a position and an option. The private-markets literature emphasises disciplined pacing across vintages and the value of building knowledge and relationships over time (Swensen, 2009), and the behavioural literature warns that first moves into unfamiliar territory are especially prone to haste, overconfidence and the pressure to deploy (Kahneman, 2011). Together these imply that a first allocation should be approached as a measured, paced programme that builds capability as it deploys, and that the discipline to resist rushing, to complete the diligence before committing, is itself a determinant of success. This motivates the paper’s emphasis on process maturity and on the cost of haste.

2.5 Synthesis and Propositions

Taken together, these literatures imply that the outcome of a first allocation to an unfamiliar region is determined more by the quality and consistency of the diligence process, especially manager selection and operational diligence, than by the merits of the opportunity alone, and that the characteristic failure mode is haste rather than the region itself. From this the paper develops five propositions:

Proposition 1. The quality and consistency of the diligence process is the largest controllable determinant of first-allocation success.

Proposition 2. Manager selection carries disproportionate weight in a first Gulf allocation, because manager dispersion is wide and track records in a younger market are shorter.

Proposition 3. Operational due diligence functions as a gate as well as a score, and its importance rises in a younger market where operational maturity cannot be assumed.

Proposition 4. Higher diligence maturity is associated with both a higher expected outcome and lower downside risk, so the two objectives are complementary rather than in tension.

Proposition 5. The most common cause of first-allocation failure is rushing the process, not the inherent risk of the region.

2.6 Behavioural Risks in a First Allocation

A further strand of relevance is the behavioural literature on decision-making under unfamiliarity and pressure, which illuminates why first allocations are particularly error-prone (Kahneman, 2011). Several biases converge on a first move into a new region. Overconfidence leads decision-makers to overestimate their understanding of an unfamiliar market; the halo effect causes a charismatic manager or a compelling narrative to substitute for evidence; confirmation bias leads an institution that has decided it wants to allocate to gather support rather than test the decision; and the pressure to deploy capital, especially once a strategic decision to enter the region has been announced internally, creates a bias toward action over diligence. The home-bias literature adds that unfamiliarity itself distorts judgement, sometimes toward excessive caution and sometimes, once the decision to enter is made, toward insufficient scrutiny of the specific opportunities (French and Poterba, 1991). The practical significance is that a structured, consistently applied diligence process is not merely an organisational nicety but a defence against predictable cognitive errors, and that the framework set out in this paper functions, in part, as a debiasing device: by specifying in advance what must be assessed and how, it interrupts the intuitive leaps that bias exploits. This is a further reason, beyond the manager-selection and operational evidence, that process quality is the largest controllable determinant of first-allocation success.

2.7 Process Quality and the Limited Partner Performance Puzzle

A particularly relevant finding for first-time allocators is the limited-partner performance puzzle: research showing that the institutions selecting private-market managers vary widely in the returns they achieve, and that some categories of investor systematically under-perform because of weaker selection and governance (Lerner, Schoar and Wongsunwai, 2007). The lesson is that the same opportunity set delivers different results to different investors depending on the quality of their process, which is the empirical counterpart to this paper's central claim. For a first-time Gulf allocator the implication is sobering and motivating in equal measure: the region will not deliver a uniform result to all who enter it, and the institution's own process will substantially determine where in the distribution of outcomes it lands. This reframes the first allocation from a question of whether the region is attractive, which the broader evidence answers, to a question of whether the institution's process is good enough to capture that attractiveness, which only the institution can answer. It also explains why two institutions allocating to the same region through ostensibly similar managers can experience very different outcomes, and why the investment in process quality is, on the evidence, among the highest-return decisions a first-time allocator makes.

3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY

This study is a framework paper supported by a stylised, clearly-labelled analysis rather than an econometric study. Its aim is to set out a structured diligence process and to make explicit the relationships, between diligence maturity, outcome and risk, that justify it, using assumptions stated transparently rather than estimated from a proprietary dataset. The figures illustrate relationships and orders of magnitude that an institution can validate against its own experience, and they are not forecasts.

3.1 The Six-Phase Framework

The framework divides a first-allocation programme into six phases: strategy and sizing; market and risk assessment; manager selection; operational due diligence; structuring and legal; and monitoring. Each phase has defined objectives, inputs and outputs, and the framework specifies where diligence effort should be concentrated. The phases are sequential in emphasis but overlapping in practice, and the framework is designed to be applied consistently across managers and commitments so that decisions are comparable.

3.2 The Maturity Assessment

To make explicit the value of process, the analysis relates the maturity of an institution’s diligence, from low, through basic and structured, to institutional, to two outcomes: the expected net result of the allocation and its downside risk. This is a stylised relationship intended to convey the direction and approximate magnitude of the effect rather than a precise estimate, and it is the analytical core of Proposition 4. The base-case assumptions underlying the framework and the maturity assessment are set out in Table 1.

Table 1. Base-Case Assumptions for the Diligence Framework

Parameter	Assumption
Allocation type	First-time institutional allocation to the Gulf
Primary access route	Commingled funds, then co-investment
Diligence timeline (first allocation)	~30 weeks end to end
Manager-selection weight in effort	Highest single phase (~25%)
Operational DD	Independent; functions as a gate
Sizing	Measured first sleeve, paced across vintages
Outcome measure	Relative net outcome and downside risk by maturity

Indicative, forward-looking assumptions used to illustrate the framework; not forecasts. See Appendix A.

4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

This section presents the framework and the supporting analysis in the order of the propositions: where diligence effort should go and the role of process (Proposition 1); manager selection (Proposition 2); operational due diligence (Proposition 3); the relationship between maturity, outcome and risk (Proposition 4); and the cost of haste (Proposition 5), with the access routes, timeline and tools that operationalise the framework.

4.1 Where Diligence Effort Should Go

The first question a first-time allocator faces is where to concentrate finite diligence effort. Figure 1 sets out the recommended allocation across the six phases.

Figure 1. Where Diligence Effort Should Go



Indicative allocation of diligence effort across the six phases of a first Gulf allocation.

The allocation reflects Propositions 1 and 2. Manager selection receives the largest single share, because it is the largest driver of outcomes; market and risk assessment and operational due diligence follow, reflecting their weight in an unfamiliar and younger market; and strategy, structuring and monitoring receive smaller but essential shares. The deeper point is that the value lies not only in how effort is allocated but in the consistency with which the process is applied: a structured framework applied uniformly across managers and commitments produces comparable, defensible decisions, whereas effort applied unevenly, deep where the institution is enthusiastic and shallow where it is not, produces decisions that reflect enthusiasm rather than quality. This consistency is the substance of Proposition 1, and it is the institution's principal lever on the outcome.

4.2 Phase One: Strategy and Sizing

The first phase establishes why the institution is allocating, how much, and against what objective, and it frames every subsequent decision. The strategy should specify the role the Gulf sleeve is intended to play, income, growth, diversification or a combination, because that role determines which sub-strategies and managers are appropriate. Sizing should follow the principle that a first allocation is large enough to matter and to justify the diligence it requires, yet small enough to respect the institution's genuine familiarity, with the allocation built across vintages rather than deployed at once. The output of this phase is a clear mandate: a target sleeve size, a role, a risk budget and a pacing plan, against which managers and commitments can then be assessed. Skipping or rushing this phase is a frequent and costly error, because an allocation without a clear objective cannot be diligenced coherently, every later judgement depends on knowing what the allocation is for.

4.3 Phase Two: Market and Risk Assessment

The second phase assesses the market itself and the risks the allocation will bear, and it is where a first-time allocator must do the work that a familiar market would not require. The institution should confirm, on its own analysis, the risk characteristics of the region, the currency regime, the governance and institutional quality, the liquidity and the correlation with its existing portfolio, rather than inheriting assumptions from a regional label. Figure 2 sets out the principal risks and their treatment in a structured matrix.

Figure 2. Gulf Allocation Risk Matrix



Indicative likelihood, impact and residual-after-mitigation scores for the principal risks (1 low to 5 high).

The risk matrix supports the institution in distinguishing the risks that genuinely require mitigation from those that are already low. In the Gulf case, currency risk is low in likelihood because of the peg; governance risk is moderate and well-mitigated by the financial-centre regimes; and the residual risks that most require active management are liquidity, manager selection and concentration. Conducting this assessment explicitly, rather than relying on an inherited risk profile, is the substance of effective market diligence, and it ensures that the institution's mitigation effort, in sizing, structuring and selection, is directed at the risks that actually matter rather than at those the label merely implies.

4.4 Choosing the Access Route

A first-time allocator must decide how to take its exposure, and the route shapes cost, control and the capability required. Figure 3 compares the principal routes.

Figure 3. Access Routes: Control, Cost and Capability



Indicative scores for control, cost efficiency and capability required across access routes (1 to 5).

For a first allocation the framework recommends beginning through commingled funds, which provide diversified, professionally managed exposure with the least operational burden and the lowest capability requirement, and adding co-investment and, later, separately managed accounts and direct investment as capability and relationships develop. The figure makes the trade-off explicit: control and cost efficiency rise as one moves toward direct investment, but so does the capability required, and a first-time allocator that reaches for control it cannot yet support takes on selection and operational risk it is not equipped to bear. Matching the route to the institution's current capability is a central diligence judgement, and beginning with funds is the answer to the legitimate concern that the institution lacks local capability, the route supplies the capability while the institution builds its own.

4.5 Phase Three: Manager Selection

Manager selection is the highest-weighted phase, and Figure 4 sets out the scorecard the framework recommends for assessing managers consistently.

Figure 4. Manager-Selection Scorecard Weights

Indicative weights across the dimensions that predict persistent manager performance.

The scorecard weights team and organisation most heavily, followed by a decomposed track record, strategy and edge, process and risk, terms and alignment, and operations, reflecting the evidence on what predicts persistence (Kaplan and Schoar, 2005). In a younger market the framework requires two adaptations. First, because fund-level track records are shorter, the institution must weight the principals' individual records, the durability of the strategy and the quality of the process more heavily than fund history alone. Second, alignment, meaningful manager commitment and fair, transparent terms, carries extra weight as the best available substitute for the long track record the market cannot yet provide. Applying the same scorecard consistently across all managers is what makes the resulting rankings comparable and defensible, which is the discipline Proposition 1 identifies as decisive.

4.6 Phase Four: Operational Due Diligence

Operational due diligence is treated by the framework as a gate as well as a score, in line with Proposition 3 and the evidence that operational failures cause a large share of institutional losses (Brown et al., 2008). The institution should assess, independently of the investment team, each manager's fund administration, valuation policy, custody, compliance, cyber and operational resilience, and governance, and should insist on independent administration, third-party custody and external audit. In a younger market the institution cannot assume the operational maturity it would take for granted with an established Western manager, so this phase requires more, not less, scrutiny. Critically, the scoring is asymmetric: a strong operational setup adds modestly to a manager's overall assessment, but a serious operational red flag, an unverifiable valuation, a lack of independent administration, a governance gap, should override a high investment score and stop the commitment. Treating operational diligence as a gate is the single most important protection against the failures that most damage first-time allocators.

4.7 Phases Five and Six: Structuring, Legal and Monitoring

The fifth phase structures the allocation through the appropriate vehicles, typically the common-law financial centres for a Gulf allocation, addressing domicile, tax, repatriation and the legal terms of each commitment, so that the institution's governance and regulatory requirements are met and the exposure is held in a familiar legal framework. The sixth phase, monitoring, begins at commitment and continues through the life of the allocation: the institution should track each manager and the programme against the objectives set in phase one, watch for the changes, in team, strategy, process or terms, that would alter the original thesis, and treat each annual review and re-up as a fresh application of the scorecard rather than a formality. Monitoring is where much of the value of the initial diligence is preserved or lost, because an allocation diligenced carefully at entry but monitored loosely thereafter forfeits the protection the diligence was meant to provide.

Figure 5 sets out an indicative timeline for the full process, from mandate to close.

Figure 5. A First-Allocation Diligence Timeline



Indicative weeks per phase for a first Gulf allocation, from mandate to close.

The timeline, roughly thirty weeks end to end in the base case, makes explicit that a first allocation is a programme rather than a transaction, and that the diligence-intensive phases, market and risk assessment, manager selection and operational due diligence, occupy the largest share. An institution that compresses this timeline materially is, in effect, cutting diligence, which Proposition 5 identifies as the principal cause of failure. The timeline is not an argument for slowness for its own sake, but for completing the diligence properly before committing, which is a different thing from delay.

4.8 Diligence Maturity, Outcome and Risk

The central analytical result relates the maturity of the diligence process to the outcome of the allocation, testing Proposition 4. Figure 6 sets out the relationship.

Figure 6. Diligence Maturity versus Outcome and Downside Risk



Indicative relationship between diligence maturity and both expected net outcome and downside risk.

The relationship supports Proposition 4 and carries an important implication. As diligence maturity rises from low to institutional, the expected net outcome improves and the downside risk falls simultaneously: the two objectives move together rather than in tension. This is because better diligence both selects better managers and structures, raising the expected outcome, and avoids the operational failures, poor selections and structuring errors that drive the worst results, lowering the downside. For the institution, the lesson is that investing in diligence quality is not a trade-off against return but a means of improving return and reducing risk at the same time, which is among the highest-return uses of effort available in a first allocation.

4.9 The Cost of Haste

Figure 7 and the case comparison make explicit the cost of the most common failure mode, rushing the process.

Figure 7. Sensitivity of First-Allocation Success to Diligence Choices



Each bar shows the swing in the outcome score from varying one diligence choice around the base case.

The sensitivity analysis confirms Propositions 1 and 2: manager selection and the discipline of the process, including liquidity sizing, structuring quality and pacing, move the outcome most, while the currency treatment, where the peg does much of the work, matters least. Figure 8 contrasts three approaches.

Figure 8. Three Approaches to a First Gulf Allocation



Indicative net outcome and downside risk for a rushed, a structured and an institutional approach.

The contrast is stark and supports Proposition 5. The rushed allocation, which compresses diligence, selects managers on relationship and skips operational scrutiny, delivers a lower outcome and a far higher downside; the structured and institutional approaches deliver progressively better outcomes with progressively lower risk. The difference between them is not the region, which is identical across the three, but the process. This is the paper's central message in a single comparison: the failure of a first Gulf allocation, when it occurs, is overwhelmingly a failure of diligence and discipline rather than of the opportunity, and the institution that invests in the process captures both a higher return and a lower risk than one that rushes to deploy.

4.10 Common Failure Modes and How the Framework Prevents Them

It is instructive to catalogue the specific ways first allocations fail and to map each to the part of the framework that prevents it, because this makes concrete the claim that the process, not the region, is the principal risk. The first failure mode is selecting a manager on relationship or reputation rather than evidence; the consistent scorecard and the requirement to decompose the track record prevent it. The second is an operational failure or fraud at a manager that proper scrutiny would have surfaced; the independent operational-diligence gate prevents it. The third is over-sizing the first allocation so that a poor outcome is damaging rather than survivable; the sizing and pacing discipline prevents it. The fourth is structuring the allocation poorly, exposing the institution to avoidable tax, repatriation or legal risk; the structuring phase, conducted through the financial centres with proper advice, prevents it. The fifth is mis-classifying the region's risk and either over- or under-mitigating; the independent market and risk assessment prevents it. Each failure mode is thus addressed by a specific element of the framework, which is why the framework as a whole, applied consistently, reduces the probability of failure so substantially. The mapping also clarifies that the framework is not bureaucratic for its own sake: every phase exists to prevent an identifiable, costly error.

A corollary is that partial application of the framework is dangerous, because the failure modes are independent: excelling at manager selection while skipping operational diligence leaves the institution exposed to operational failure, however good its investment judgement. The protection the framework offers comes from completeness, from addressing all the failure modes rather than the ones the institution finds most congenial, which is why consistency and discipline, rather than brilliance in any single phase, are what the evidence rewards.

4.11 The First Allocation as an Investment in Capability

A first allocation should be understood not only as a position but as an investment in the institution's own capability, and this reframing changes how its success should be judged. The diligence conducted on a first Gulf allocation, the market assessment, the manager relationships, the operational reviews, the structuring knowledge, builds an institutional capability that lowers the cost and raises the quality of every subsequent allocation to the region. An institution that diligences its first allocation thoroughly emerges not only with a position but with a repeatable process, a network of managers and advisers, and a body of local knowledge that constitute a durable asset. Conversely, an institution that rushes the first allocation forgoes this capability-building and must repeat the learning, more expensively, later. Judged correctly, therefore, the return on a first allocation includes the option value of the capability it creates, which is a further argument for investing in the diligence: the effort is amortised not over the first commitment alone but over the entire future programme it enables. This is why the framework treats the first allocation as the beginning of a programme rather than a standalone transaction, and why the monitoring phase, which preserves and extends the capability, is integral rather than optional.

4.12 Diligencing the Younger-Market Manager

Manager selection in the Gulf deserves fuller treatment because it is both the highest-weighted phase and the one most affected by the region's relative youth. In an established market an institution can lean on long, audited fund track records and a deep peer set for comparison; in a younger market neither is fully available, and the diligence must adapt. The first adaptation is to assess the principals rather than only the firm, attributing prior performance carefully to the individuals and verifying that the people who generated a track record at a previous institution are the ones who will manage the new capital. The second is to weight the durability of the strategy and the repeatability of the process more heavily, since these predict future performance where a long fund history cannot. The third is to scrutinise alignment closely, a meaningful, cash-funded manager commitment and fair terms are the strongest available evidence of conviction in a market where the track record is short. The fourth is to take references seriously and widely, including off-list references the manager did not provide, because in a smaller market the informal network carries information that formal documents do not. None of these adaptations lowers the bar; they relocate it, from a reliance on fund history that the market cannot yet supply to a reliance on team, process, alignment and reference that it can. An institution that makes these adaptations can diligence a younger-market manager rigorously; one that simply applies its established-market checklist and finds the track record wanting will either wrongly exclude good managers or, worse, fall back on relationship in the absence of the data it expected.

A related point concerns the emerging manager specifically, who is common in a younger market and who poses a particular version of this challenge. First-time and emerging managers can be among the most attractive opportunities, hungry, aligned and pursuing strategies before they become crowded, but they lack the fund track record and the operational maturity of established firms. The framework accommodates them by leaning harder on the team's individual records, the strategy and, above all, operational diligence, since a new firm's back office is unproven and operational risk is correspondingly higher. An institution unwilling to back any manager without a long fund history will exclude much of the opportunity in a younger market; one that can diligence an emerging manager rigorously, on the adapted basis described here, gains access to it while managing the additional risk.

4.13 Building the Monitoring Programme

Monitoring deserves elaboration because it is where the value of the initial diligence is preserved over the life of the allocation, and where first-time allocators most often relax once the commitments are made. An effective monitoring programme tracks each manager against the same dimensions the scorecard assessed at entry, watching for the changes that would alter the original thesis: departures from the team, drift from the strategy, growth beyond the strategy's capacity, deterioration in process or weakening of terms at the next fund. It also tracks the operational dimension continuously, since operational risk does not end at commitment, and it monitors the programme as a whole, its pacing, its diversification across managers and vintages, and its liquidity, rather than only the individual commitments. Crucially, the framework treats each annual review and each re-up decision as a fresh application of the scorecard, with the same rigour as the original selection, because the decision to commit again to a manager is itself a selection decision and is especially prone to being made on relationship and inertia rather than current evidence. An institution that monitors with this discipline preserves the protection its initial diligence provided and continues to build the capability that the first allocation began; one that monitors loosely forfeits both, and may find that an allocation diligenced well at entry has quietly deteriorated by the time it commits again.

4.14 Calibrating the Size of the First Commitment

The sizing of the first commitment deserves specific treatment, because it is a decision in which competing pressures pull in opposite directions and in which the framework offers clear guidance. On one side, the allocation should be large enough to matter, to justify the diligence and relationship-building it requires and to make a meaningful contribution to the portfolio; an allocation too small to notice is rarely worth the effort and tends to be neglected. On the other side, it should be small enough that a poor first outcome is survivable and that the institution is not over-committed to a market it is still learning. The framework resolves this tension by recommending a measured first sleeve, sized against its diversification contribution rather than a return target, and built across vintages rather than deployed at once, so that the institution can learn and adjust as it goes. The pacing is itself a risk-management tool: by committing steadily rather than in a single tranche, the institution avoids concentrating the outcome on one entry point and retains the option to slow or accelerate as its conviction and capability develop. A first commitment sized and paced this way is large enough to build capability and small enough to be safe, which is exactly the balance a first allocation requires, and getting this calibration right is one of the higher-order judgements the framework supports.

4.15 Structuring, Repatriation and the Legal Phase in Practice

The structuring and legal phase, though weighted below selection and operational diligence, is where a first-time allocator most often encounters the unfamiliar mechanics of a new jurisdiction, and a brief elaboration is warranted. The framework recommends that a first Gulf allocation be structured through the common-law financial centres, the Dubai International Financial Centre or the Abu Dhabi Global Market, which allow the institution to hold and govern its exposure under familiar legal principles, with established fund, custody and reporting standards that satisfy both its own requirements and those of its regulators. Two practical questions recur and both have reassuring answers that the legal phase should confirm for the specific structure. On repatriation, the absence of exchange controls and the free movement of capital mean the institution can deploy and recover capital without the trapped-capital risk that deters allocation to some markets. On tax, the corporate-tax regime preserves neutrality for qualifying investment activity and the treaty network is expanding, so a properly structured allocation is generally efficient and predictable. The legal phase should also address the specific terms of each commitment, the fund documents, side letters and any most-favoured-nation provisions, with the same rigour an institution applies in familiar markets. Conducted properly, this phase removes two of the objections most often raised against a first Gulf allocation, the fear of trapped capital and of unpredictable tax, and it does so by confirming, for the institution's own structure, answers that hold generally for the jurisdiction.

5. ROBUSTNESS AND SCENARIO ANALYSIS

A disciplined framework must be tested against its assumptions and against the scenario in which the allocation goes wrong despite good process. This section reports a sensitivity analysis and a stressed scenario.

5.1 Sensitivity to Diligence Choices

The sensitivity analysis of Figure 7 establishes that the outcome is most sensitive to manager selection and to the disciplines of liquidity sizing, structuring and pacing, and least sensitive to the currency treatment. This ordering directs the institution's effort: the marginal hour of diligence is best spent on selection and on the disciplines that protect against the downside, rather than on the dimensions where the region's structural features already do the work. It also confirms that the framework's allocation of effort, weighting manager selection and operational diligence most heavily, is aligned with where the outcome is actually determined.

5.2 The Stressed Scenario: When Good Process Still Disappoints

Even a well-diligenced first allocation can disappoint if the region or a manager performs poorly, and the framework should be honest about this. Good process improves the odds and limits the downside; it does not guarantee the outcome. The appropriate response to this reality is built into the framework: sizing the first allocation modestly so that a poor outcome is survivable; pacing across vintages so that the institution is not concentrated in a single bad entry; and diversifying across managers so that a single manager's failure is not fatal. Under a stressed scenario in which the region underperforms, an institution that has followed the framework, measured sizing, diversified managers, robust operational diligence, will experience a disappointing but contained result, whereas one that rushed, concentrated and skipped operational scrutiny may experience a damaging one. The value of the process, in other words, is most visible precisely in the bad scenario, where it converts a potential disaster into a manageable disappointment.

5.3 Sensitivity to the Institution's Starting Capability

The framework's emphasis shifts with the institution's starting capability, and recognising this helps an institution apply it appropriately. An institution with little prior alternatives or emerging-market experience should weight the early phases, strategy, market assessment and the choice to begin through funds, most heavily, and should lean on external advisers and commingled managers to supply capability it does not yet possess. An institution with substantial alternatives experience but no Gulf exposure can move faster through the generic phases and concentrate its effort on the region-specific elements, the local market assessment, the younger-market manager selection and the financial-centre structuring. The framework is therefore not a one-size-fits-all checklist but a structure to be calibrated to the institution's starting point, and a sensible first step is for the institution to assess honestly where its capability is strong and where it is thin, and to direct its diligence effort and external support accordingly. This honest self-assessment is itself part of good process, because the most dangerous institution is one that overestimates its capability in an unfamiliar market and accordingly under-resources the diligence.

5.4 Engaging Local Expertise

A specific implementation question concerns the role of local expertise, which a first-time allocator should engage deliberately rather than rely on the generic knowledge of its existing teams. Local advisers, lawyers, operational reviewers and managers bring knowledge of the market, the regulatory environment, the manager landscape and the practical mechanics of structuring and repatriation that an institution cannot acquire quickly from a distance. The framework recommends engaging such expertise early, in the market-assessment and structuring phases especially, while retaining the institution's own independent judgement over the decisions. The balance to strike is to use local expertise to inform the diligence without outsourcing the decision: the institution should understand the market well enough to challenge its advisers, not simply defer to them. Engaging local expertise is not an admission of weakness but a mark of good process, and the cost of doing so is small relative to the errors it prevents in an unfamiliar market.

5.5 Governance of the First-Allocation Decision

The governance around the first-allocation decision warrants specific attention, because an unfamiliar decision is most vulnerable to weak governance. The investment committee should be presented not only with the recommended managers but with the diligence process that produced them, the scorecard results, the operational-diligence findings and the risks and their mitigations, so that it can assess the quality of the process and not merely the conclusion. The committee should be encouraged to probe the diligence, to ask what would have caused a manager to be rejected and whether that test was genuinely applied, rather than to ratify an enthusiastic recommendation. And the decision should be documented, including the rationale and the risks accepted, so that later monitoring and re-up decisions can be judged against the original thesis. Good governance does not slow a sound decision; it ensures that the decision is sound, and for a first allocation to an unfamiliar region it is the institutional counterpart to the analytical discipline the framework provides.

5.6 From First Allocation to Standing Programme

The final implementation consideration is the transition from a first allocation to a standing programme, which the framework anticipates from the outset. A first allocation conducted well establishes the components, the diligence process, the manager relationships, the operational and structuring knowledge and the monitoring routine, that a continuing programme requires, and the institution should treat the first allocation explicitly as the foundation of that programme rather than as a one-off. Practically, this means documenting the process so it can be repeated and improved, retaining the relationships and local expertise developed during the first allocation, and planning the pacing of subsequent commitments so that the programme builds steadily toward its target over several years. An institution that makes a single first commitment and then pauses indefinitely forfeits much of the capability it built; one that uses the first allocation to launch a paced, continuing programme compounds the capability and the local knowledge over time, which is what distinguishes allocators who succeed durably in a region from those who dip in and out. The framework, in this sense, is not only a guide to a first allocation but the template for the programme the first allocation begins.

5.7 Measuring the Success of the Diligence Itself

A subtle but valuable implementation practice is to measure the quality of the diligence process, not only the performance of the resulting allocation. Because outcomes in private markets are realised only over years, an institution that judges its diligence solely by the eventual return waits too long to learn whether its process is sound, and risks attributing to skill or error what was in fact luck. A better practice is to assess the process directly and contemporaneously: was the framework applied consistently across managers; were the operational gates genuinely enforced; were rejected managers rejected for the stated reasons; was the sizing and pacing discipline maintained under the pressure to deploy. An institution that reviews its process in these terms can improve it continuously, independent of the noise in any single allocation’s outcome, and can distinguish a good decision that happened to disappoint from a poor decision that happened to succeed. For a first-time allocator especially, this process-level measurement is how the institution builds, over its early allocations, the institutional capability that the framework is ultimately designed to create.

5.8 Common Objections to a Structured First-Allocation Process

Two objections are commonly raised against the kind of structured process this paper advocates, and both deserve a direct answer. The first is that such a process is too slow, that a thirty-week diligence timeline risks missing opportunities in a fast-moving market. The answer is that the timeline reflects the genuine work of diligence rather than delay, and that the cost of missing an occasional opportunity is small relative to the cost of a poorly diligenced commitment; moreover, much of the timeline is one-off, the market assessment and process build are reused across subsequent commitments, so the marginal diligence on later allocations is faster. The second objection is that a structured process is disproportionate for a first allocation that is, by design, modest in size. The answer is that it is precisely the first allocation, where the institution is least familiar and the risk of error greatest, that most needs the protection, and that the process build is an investment in capability that pays off across the whole future programme rather than the first commitment alone. Neither objection, examined, survives, and both tend in practice to be rationalisations for the haste that the evidence identifies as the principal cause of failure. Recognising them as such is part of the discipline the framework is meant to instil.

A third, more reasonable concern is cost: a full diligence process, including independent operational review and local advisers, is not free. The appropriate response is to size the diligence to the allocation and to recognise that the cost, while real, is modest relative to the size of the commitment and trivial relative to the cost of a failed one. For a genuinely small initial allocation an institution may scale the process sensibly, leaning more on commingled funds whose managers and administrators have themselves been vetted by other institutional investors, but it should not skip the elements, manager selection rigour and operational diligence, that protect against the costliest failures. Scaling the process to the allocation is legitimate; abandoning its core is not.

6. IMPLEMENTATION CONSIDERATIONS

The framework translates into a small number of practical commitments an institution should make before beginning a first Gulf allocation.

6.1 Build the Process Before the Position

The first commitment is to establish the diligence framework, the phases, the scorecard, the risk matrix and the operational-diligence protocol, before sourcing a single manager, so that the process governs the decisions rather than being assembled around a deal the institution has already decided it likes. Building the process first is what ensures the consistency that Proposition 1 identifies as decisive, and it guards against the natural tendency to rationalise a preferred manager.

6.2 Separate Advocacy from Scrutiny

The second commitment is to separate the people who advocate for an allocation from those whose job is to find reasons to decline it, particularly in operational due diligence, which should be conducted independently of the investment team. This separation is the structural safeguard against the optimism that infects a first move into an exciting new region, and it is standard practice in well-governed institutions for good reason.

6.3 Resource the Diligence Properly

The third commitment is to resource the diligence adequately, in time and in expertise, including engaging local advisers and independent operational reviewers where the institution lacks the inhouse capability. The cost of proper diligence is modest relative to the size of the allocation and trivial relative to the cost of a failed one, and the temptation to economise on diligence for a first, relatively small allocation is a false economy, because it is precisely the first allocation, where the institution is least familiar, that most needs the protection.

Before the formal conclusions, it is worth restating the practical stake. The difference between a well-diligenced and a rushed first allocation is not a marginal difference in return; it is, as the case comparison showed, the difference between a contained, capability-building first programme and a damaging one that may sour the institution on the region entirely. Because a poor first experience often deters an institution from a second attempt, the stakes of getting the first allocation right extend beyond the allocation itself to whether the institution captures the opportunity at all. This raises the return on good diligence further: it protects not only the first commitment but the institution's willingness to pursue a region that, on the broader evidence, merits a place in its portfolio.

A final reflection concerns the relationship between this framework and the broader case for a Gulf allocation. Companion analyses establish that the region is under-owned, that its currency risk is removed by the peg, and that its risk-adjusted profile is closer to developed than to emerging markets. Those analyses make the case for allocating; this paper makes the case for allocating well. The two are complementary: the strategic case opens the question, and the diligence framework answers the practical one of how to act on it without taking avoidable risk. An institution persuaded by the strategic case but lacking a disciplined way to execute it may either hesitate indefinitely or rush in carelessly, and neither serves it. The framework provides the missing middle, a structured path from conviction to a sound first programme, and in doing so it removes the last legitimate obstacle, the absence of a process, between an institution and the opportunity the broader evidence identifies.

It is worth drawing out one implication that runs through the whole analysis: that the discipline a first allocation requires is the same discipline that good institutional investing requires everywhere, simply applied where it is hardest to maintain. There is nothing in this framework that a well-governed institution does not already do in its familiar markets, a clear mandate, rigorous manager selection, independent operational diligence, careful structuring, disciplined sizing and continuous monitoring. The contribution of the framework is to insist that these disciplines be carried into an unfamiliar region precisely where the temptation to relax them, under the pressure of unfamiliarity, enthusiasm and the desire to deploy, is greatest. The institution that succeeds in its first Gulf allocation will not have done anything exotic; it will have done the ordinary things well in an unfamiliar setting, which is both reassuring, because the institution already knows how, and demanding, because the setting makes consistency hard.

Finally, it bears emphasis that the framework is a means and not an end. Its purpose is not to generate documentation or to satisfy a governance requirement for its own sake, but to ensure that the institution's capital is committed on the basis of evidence and discipline rather than enthusiasm and haste. An institution can complete every phase mechanically and still allocate poorly if it treats the framework as a checklist to be cleared rather than a discipline to be embodied; conversely, an institution that internalises the spirit of the framework, rigour, consistency, independence and patience, will allocate well even where the specifics of its process differ from those set out here. The framework, in other words, codifies a way of thinking about a first allocation as much as a sequence of steps, and it is the way of thinking, more than the steps, that determines the result. For the institution standing at the threshold of its first Gulf allocation, the invitation of this paper is to bring to the unfamiliar the same disciplined judgement it brings to the familiar, and to recognise that, in doing so, it controls the largest determinant of whether the allocation succeeds.

In the end, the case this paper makes is an optimistic one for the disciplined institution. The broader evidence holds that the Gulf is an attractive and under-owned destination for institutional capital; the concern that has held many institutions back is not, on examination, the merit of the opportunity but the unfamiliarity of acting on it. This paper's contribution is to dissolve that concern by supplying the missing process. An institution that follows a structured, well-resourced and independently scrutinised diligence framework can make a first Gulf allocation with the same confidence it brings to a familiar market, because it will have brought to the unfamiliar decision the same discipline that makes its familiar decisions sound. The first allocation, approached this way, becomes not a leap of faith but a measured, capability-building step, and the institution that takes it well positions itself to capture an opportunity that, on the weight of the evidence, rewards those who act with discipline while it remains under-owned.

7. CONCLUDING COMMENTS

This paper has set out a structured due-diligence framework for an institution making its first allocation to the United Arab Emirates and the wider Gulf, and has argued that the quality and consistency of that diligence is the largest controllable determinant of the outcome. The findings are consistent across the propositions. Process quality, applied consistently across managers and commitments, is the institution's principal lever on success (Proposition 1). Manager selection carries disproportionate weight, especially in a younger market with shorter track records, and should be conducted with a consistent scorecard adapted to that reality (Proposition 2). Operational due diligence functions as a gate as well as a score, and its importance rises where operational maturity cannot be assumed (Proposition 3). Higher diligence maturity raises the expected outcome and lowers the downside simultaneously, so investing in process is not a trade-off against return (Proposition 4). And the most common cause of first-allocation failure is rushing the process rather than the inherent risk of the region (Proposition 5).

The implication for the institution is that a first Gulf allocation should be approached as a test of process, and that the investment in a structured, well-resourced and independently scrutinised diligence framework is among the highest-return uses of effort available. The framework set out here, six phases with effort concentrated on market assessment, manager selection and operational diligence, a consistent scorecard, a risk matrix, a realistic timeline and disciplined sizing and pacing, provides the path from a strategic decision to allocate to a sound first programme. Followed properly, it both improves the expected outcome and contains the downside, which is precisely what an institution making an unfamiliar first commitment should want.

The deeper lesson is that the risk of a first allocation to an unfamiliar region lies less in the region than in the institution's own process. The region's characteristics, examined in companion analyses, are favourable; the danger is that an institution, unfamiliar and eager to deploy, abandons the discipline it would apply to a familiar market and substitutes relationship and haste for rigour. The framework is, in essence, a device for ensuring that the institution brings to an unfamiliar decision the same process it brings to a familiar one, which is the single most important thing it can do to make the first allocation a success rather than a cautionary tale.

The study is subject to limitations that also define its contribution. It is a framework paper supported by stylised, clearly-labelled illustration rather than by an empirical study of first allocations, and the relationships it draws between diligence maturity, outcome and risk are directional rather than precisely estimated. The framework is general and will require adaptation to each institution’s governance, scale and constraints, and the manager-selection and operational-diligence components draw on established practice that continues to evolve. These limitations point to the natural avenues for further research: empirical study of the relationship between diligence process and realised outcomes in first allocations to new regions; analysis of operational-failure rates among managers in younger markets; and development of selection frameworks specifically calibrated to short-track-record environments. In the meantime, the framework offers an institution a structured, defensible path to a first Gulf allocation, and the evidence and experience on which it draws are sufficient to make the case that process, more than the region, determines the result.

In sum, the contribution of this paper is to provide an institution with a structured, defensible path from the decision to allocate to the Gulf to a sound first programme, and to make explicit the evidence that the quality of that path, more than the characteristics of the region, determines the outcome. The framework, six phases with effort concentrated where outcomes are determined, a consistent scorecard, an operational-diligence gate, disciplined sizing and pacing, and continuous monitoring, is offered as a practical tool, and the propositions on which it rests are framed to be testable as evidence on first allocations accumulates. The enduring message is simple: a first allocation to an unfamiliar region is a test of process, the institution controls the process, and the institution that invests in it captures both a higher expected return and a lower risk than one that does not. For an institution standing at the threshold of its first Gulf allocation, that is both a reassurance and an instruction.

A closing word on how this framework relates to the institution’s wider practice. Nothing here is specific to the Gulf in its principles; the six phases, the scorecard, the operational gate, the sizing and pacing discipline and the monitoring routine are the components of sound institutional investing in any market. What is specific to the Gulf, and to any first allocation to an unfamiliar region, is the heightened importance of applying these components rigorously where the familiar shortcuts are unavailable and the temptation to relax them is strong. An institution that already invests well in its familiar markets possesses everything it needs to allocate well to the Gulf; the framework simply ensures that it carries that competence across the boundary of the unfamiliar rather than leaving it behind. For institutions that have not yet built such a process even in familiar markets, a first Gulf allocation is an opportunity to build one, since the discipline acquired here will serve every future allocation, in the Gulf and beyond. Either way, the investment in process is the investment that compounds, and the first allocation, approached as this paper recommends, is both a sound entry to an attractive region and a lasting addition to the institution’s own capability. That dual return, on the position and on the capability, is the strongest argument for doing the first allocation properly, and it is the note on which this paper concludes.

DISCLOSURES

The author is an independent researcher and transaction advisor who advises institutional and family-office investors on matters including capital allocation, manager selection and structuring related to the markets discussed in this paper, and may have professional or commercial interests in transactions involving the Gulf region. This paper is provided for information and educational purposes only; it does not constitute investment, tax, legal or operational-diligence advice, an offer or solicitation, or a recommendation regarding any manager, security or strategy. The figures presented are modelled and illustrative, are not forecasts, and should be independently verified. Readers should obtain advice appropriate to their own circumstances and jurisdiction, and conduct their own diligence, before acting.

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About the Author

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APPENDIX A. BASE-CASE ASSUMPTIONS

Table 2. Parameters Used in the Framework

Parameter	Indicative value

End-to-end diligence timeline	~30 weeks
Strategy and sizing (effort)	15%
Market and risk assessment	20%
Manager selection	25%
Operational due diligence	15%
Structuring and legal	12%
Monitoring	13%
First-allocation size	Measured sleeve, paced over ~5 years
Primary access route	Commingled funds, then co-investment

Indicative, forward-looking assumptions used to illustrate the framework; not forecasts.

APPENDIX B. A FIRST-ALLOCATION DILIGENCE CHECKLIST

- Is there a clear mandate: target sleeve size, role, risk budget and pacing plan?
- Have the region's risks been assessed independently, not inherited from a regional label?
- Is the access route matched to the institution's current capability (funds first)?
- Is a consistent manager-selection scorecard applied across all managers?
- Has the track record been decomposed and tested for persistence?
- Has independent operational due diligence cleared each manager as a gate?
- Is the structure established through an appropriate common-law financial centre?
- Have repatriation and tax treatment been confirmed?
- Is the allocation sized modestly and paced across vintages?
- Is advocacy separated from scrutiny, and is the diligence adequately resourced?
- Is a monitoring framework in place that re-applies the scorecard at each review?

APPENDIX C. GLOSSARY

The following terms are used in this paper. Definitions are provided for the general reader and are not intended as formal definitions.

Access route The structure through which an investor takes exposure to a market: commingled fund, separately managed account, co-investment or direct.

Co-investment Investing directly alongside a fund manager in a specific deal, usually with reduced or no fees and carry.

Commingled fund A pooled vehicle in which many investors' capital is managed together by a manager.

Due diligence The structured investigation an investor conducts before committing capital, covering investment and operational dimensions.

Gate (in diligence) A criterion that must be passed for a commitment to proceed, regardless of strength elsewhere; operational due diligence functions as one.

Investment committee (IC) The body within an institution that approves or declines investment decisions.

Liquidity reserve Cash or liquid assets held to meet capital calls and obligations without forced selling of illiquid holdings.

Manager selection The process of choosing the fund managers through which an allocation is expressed; the largest driver of private-market outcomes.

Mandate The defined objective, size, risk budget and constraints governing an allocation.

Operational due diligence (ODD) Independent review of a manager's administration, valuation, custody, compliance and governance, distinct from investment diligence.

Pacing Committing capital steadily across years (vintages) rather than all at once, to diversify entry timing and smooth cash flows.

Persistence The tendency of a manager's relative performance to repeat across successive funds; stronger in private than public markets.

Process (investment) The consistent, governed way an institution makes and reviews decisions; itself a source of return.

Residual risk The risk remaining after mitigation; for a Gulf allocation, principally liquidity.

Risk budget The total risk an institution is willing to bear, allocated across holdings.

Risk matrix A structured tool mapping risks by likelihood, impact and residual level after mitigation.

Scorecard A weighted framework for assessing managers consistently across defined dimensions.

Separately managed account (SMA) A bespoke mandate managed for a single institution, offering greater control and better economics than a fund.

Sleeve A discrete allocation to a strategy or region within a broader portfolio.

Track-record decomposition Separating a reported return into market, leverage, timing and genuine skill components.

Vintage The year a commitment begins investing; diversifying across vintages spreads entry-timing risk.

Emerging manager A new or early-stage fund manager without a long fund track record; common in younger markets and requiring adapted diligence.

Off-list reference A reference the manager did not provide, sought independently to obtain a less curated view.

Re-up A commitment to a manager's successor fund; itself a selection decision requiring fresh diligence.

Capability (institutional) The people, processes, relationships and knowledge an institution possesses to assess and manage an allocation.

Debiasing Structuring a decision process to counteract predictable cognitive biases such as overconfidence and confirmation bias.

Limited partner (LP) An investor that commits capital to a fund managed by a general partner; here, the allocating institution.

Performance puzzle The empirical finding that different LPs achieve materially different returns from the same opportunity set, due to varying process quality.

Standing programme A continuing, paced allocation programme, as distinct from a one-off first commitment.

Diligence maturity The degree of structure, rigour and consistency in an institution's due-diligence process, from low to institutional.

Most-favoured-nation clause A fund-document provision entitling an investor to terms at least as good as those granted to other investors.

Side letter A bilateral agreement between an investor and a manager modifying or supplementing the fund terms for that investor.

Process-level measurement Assessing the quality of the diligence process itself, contemporaneously, rather than inferring it from eventual outcomes.

Common-law financial centre A jurisdiction such as the DIFC or ADGM applying English-style common law with independent courts, used to structure allocations.