UK Aerospace Carve-Outs: Separating Certification Evidence, Engineering Data and Digital Threads

A Transaction and Separation-Control Framework for Airworthiness, Configuration Authority, Customer Delivery and Digital Continuity

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Abstract

An aerospace carve-out can separate legal ownership in a day while leaving certification evidence, engineering authority, configuration records, customer delivery and digital systems entangled for years. The decisive transaction question is whether the carved-out business can continue to design, produce, support and deliver its approved products through closing and separation. Approval certificates, type-design data, production records, delegated authorities, supplier evidence, software, tooling and the digital thread must form a coherent operating chain.

This paper develops a UK Aerospace Carve-Out Separation Framework for corporate sellers, strategic buyers, private equity sponsors, lenders, boards and transaction teams. It connects UK Part 21 design and production approvals to the legal perimeter, people, facilities, engineering data, product configuration, record retention, cyber controls, customer obligations, transition services, stranded costs and valuation. The method treats the digital thread as governed evidence infrastructure. It can improve lineage, reconciliation and change control, while accountable engineering, quality and regulatory authorities retain their formal responsibilities.

The worked case is wholly hypothetical. A diversified group considers separating an aerospace components and systems business with assumed annual revenue of GBP 310 million, adjusted EBITDA of GBP 43 million, 1,480 employees and an indicative enterprise value of GBP 470 million. The model assumes GBP 27 million of separation expenditure, a 24-month transition-services envelope and staged migration of engineering and product-lifecycle systems. The central case assumes no customer-delivery interruption and GBP 38 million of recurring stand-alone costs. The downside assumes delayed approval changes, duplicated engineering systems, certification-record remediation and customer penalties. Every amount, percentage, timetable and operating result is illustrative.

The central conclusion is that value follows evidence continuity. The transaction perimeter should be tested through a certification-lineage map, a digital-thread dependency model, an approval-and-authority matrix, a transition-services exit schedule and reverse stress tests. Signing and closing protections should respond to named evidence gaps. Day One should preserve configuration authority, product conformity, customer communication and release controls. Separation milestones should require proof that the carved-out business can operate without hidden seller dependencies.

JEL Classification: G34, L62, O32, O33, K23

Keywords: UK aerospace carve-outs, Part 21, design organisation approval, production organisation approval, certification evidence, engineering data, digital thread, configuration control, transition services, M&A

1. Define the carve-out decision

The board must decide whether the proposed perimeter can operate as an approved, customer-ready and cash-generative aerospace business after separation. The decision record should name the legal entities, sites, product families, approvals, design and production responsibilities, customer contracts, people, intellectual property, tooling, supplier rights, engineering systems and records that transfer. It should identify every dependency retained by the seller or a third party.

The separation thesis needs four linked tests. First, the approval and authority test asks whether the organisation may continue the relevant design, production, conformity and support activities. Second, the evidence test asks whether the complete and current certification and configuration record will be available to authorised people. Third, the delivery test asks whether customers can receive conforming products and support without interruption. Fourth, the economic test asks whether stand-alone cost, transition expenditure, trapped cash and dis-synergies are reflected in price and funding.

This framework supports transaction, operational, regulatory, technology and financial diligence. It does not determine airworthiness, regulatory approval, export classification, legal enforceability, accounting, tax or fair value. Competent authorities and qualified advisers retain those roles. The board retains responsibility for the transaction decision.

2. Start with an evidence hierarchy

The diligence file should distinguish authoritative records, independently verified records, controlled company records, analytical outputs and transaction assumptions. Authoritative records include approvals, certificates, competent-authority correspondence, design, production and conformity records and executed contracts. Independent reports can support facility, environmental, cyber, financial, legal and technical conclusions. Controlled company records include authorised staff lists, training files, engineering records, non-conformance records, calibration logs, labour bookings and invoices.

Dashboards and models can organise evidence, but they do not outrank the source. A capacity chart cannot override an approval limitation. A digital-thread exception score cannot override an authorised engineer's documented finding or a certifying employee's responsibility. A sales pipeline cannot replace an executed work order. A high utilisation percentage can conceal overtime, subcontracting, remediation or work-in-progress congestion.

Every material metric should have a source, owner, calculation, frequency, control and reconciliation. Conflicts should become diligence issues with assigned owners and resolution dates. Averaging inconsistent records can remove the signal that matters most. The evidence hierarchy creates a defensible path from observed operations to valuation and transaction terms.

3. Map the UK regulatory perimeter

The regulatory map should show every UK CAA design organisation approval, production organisation approval and other relevant approval, including scope, limitations, sites, terms of approval, nominated personnel and applicable handbooks. It should connect each approval to the products, data, people, processes, suppliers and facilities inside the transaction perimeter.

UK CAA guidance for Part 21 design approval requires an applicant with its principal place of business in the UK to demonstrate compliance with Subpart J and to provide the design organisation handbook, key personnel and supporting evidence. Production-organisation changes that are significant to product conformity or airworthiness, including changes to the quality system, require prior approval under 21.A.147. UK CAA guidance on transferability states that approval transfer is generally excluded; exceptional continuity can arise in a direct ownership transfer only where the approved organisation

remains effectively unchanged. Changes to address, facilities, type of work, staff or accountable management can require a new investigation [1-4].

The transaction plan should classify each proposed change as ownership continuity, significant approval change, new approval application, notification, customer consent or internal controlled change. It should identify the responsible applicant, submission contents, regulator engagement, dependencies and contingency. Signing and closing documents should avoid assuming that a certificate follows the assets automatically.

Table 1. Certification lineage from approval to customer delivery

Evidence layer	Primary records	Separation question	Transaction use
approval scope	certificate, terms, handbook and authority correspondence	which activity may continue, where and under whose authority?	perimeter and conditions
design basis	type-design definition, compliance evidence and approved changes	can the organisation prove the approved configuration?	data transfer and warranties
production conformity	production data, supplier evidence, inspection and release	can each delivered item be traced to approved design data?	Day One continuity
configuration	baselines, change records, effectivity and deviations	which product state is current for each customer?	migration acceptance
customer delivery	contract, acceptance, support and service records	what evidence triggers delivery, revenue and cash?	value and working capital

Proposed diligence structure; the UK CAA and qualified advisers determine the applicable approval path.

4. Reconcile the legal and operating perimeter

The legal perimeter should identify every company, branch, site, lease, asset, employee, contract, permit, approval, data set and liability included in the deal. The operational perimeter should identify which entity actually performs each activity and which entity employs the authorised people. Shared services, central quality functions and group-level IT can create separation dependencies that are invisible in standalone accounts.

The carved-out business may use seller-owned software, OEM portals, pooled tooling, group insurance, common procurement contracts or central training. Each dependency should have a proposed replacement, transition service, licence or long-term agreement. The buyer should test whether the carved-out business can continue to schedule, execute, certify, invoice and collect work on the first day after completion.

The accounting perimeter should reconcile statutory accounts, management accounts and the deal model. Intercompany revenue, charges, leases and allocations require normalisation. The approved-organisation perimeter should then reconcile to the legal and accounting perimeter. A transaction that acquires revenue without the people, data or approvals required to perform the work will not preserve the reported economics.

5. Build the approval and capability matrix

The capability matrix should list each approval and customer authorisation against aircraft family, engine, component, evidence review method, production process and site. It should show whether the capability is performed internally, subcontracted or unavailable. It should also record the tooling, data, training, certifying authorisation and recurring investment needed to maintain the capability.

This matrix separates commercial labels from executable scope. A carved-out business can market a full service while depending on outside specialists for non-destructive testing, component production, plating, calibration or design support. Subcontracting can be efficient; it also creates lead-time, margin, control and concentration exposures that must enter the forecast.

The buyer should map future demand to this capability base. Fleet transition, aircraft age, engine shop-visit cycles and customer sourcing decisions can change workload. The deal model should avoid attributing revenue to a capability that requires a new approval, new data licence, major tooling or scarce authorisation unless the required time, cost and execution risk are included.

Table 2. Approval, authority and change-control matrix

Change or dependency	Evidence owner	Required decision	Separation gate
legal ownership and control	company secretary and accountable manager	notification, continuity analysis or application	before completion
design organisation scope	head of design organisation	approved scope and handbook change	before independent design activity
production organisation scope	accountable manager and quality director	significant-change approval where applicable	before production under new perimeter
facilities and locations	operations and quality	site approval and readiness evidence	before work transfer
authorised people	functional authority	appointment, competence and delegation	before decision authority transfers
engineering systems	chief engineer and IT	validated workflow and authoritative record	before seller system exit
customer and supplier interfaces	programme and commercial leads	consent, notice or accepted transition	before contract migration

Proposed separation control; the applicable authority and approval path require transaction-specific confirmation.

6. Measure facilities, tooling and engineering capacity

Production-floor area is not equivalent to productive capacity. Throughput depends on production cell dimensions, door access, docking, cranes, power, lighting, environmental controls, tooling, stores, evidence review access, planning and the interaction of simultaneous engineering work packages. A site can have nominal space while one scarce dock, test cell or specialist process determines output.

The capacity model should begin with the engineering work package and identify its critical path. It should measure scheduled hours, elapsed days, labour mix, production cell occupancy, tool occupancy, material availability and evidence review gates. It should separate planned maintenance, unscheduled findings and customer-driven changes. Each constraint should be expressed in units relevant to management: controlled work-package days, engine test hours, component-cell hours or authorised shifts.

Observed performance should be segmented by aircraft or component type, check type, site, customer and season. Average separation and delivery can conceal an unstable tail. Percentiles, variance and reasons for delay reveal the operational capacity that a buyer can underwrite. The model should treat safety and regulatory control as fixed boundaries, not variables that can be traded for output.

7. Reconcile authorised people and delegated authority

The labour model should distinguish total headcount, productive engineers, support staff, authorised engineers, certifying employees, planners, engineers and contractors. It should map licences, type ratings, company authorisations, shift coverage, recency, training and supervision. A large workforce may still have a narrow authorisation bottleneck.

Productive hours should reconcile roster, attendance, time booking, engineering records and payroll. The buyer should understand overtime, agency labour, travel teams, subcontracting and learning curves. Overtime can support peaks but may raise fatigue, error and retention risk. Contractor dependence can add flexibility while weakening margin or access to proprietary knowledge.

The diligence model should identify single points of failure. A process may depend on a small group who hold specific certifying authority, non-destructive-testing qualification, engine experience or customer acceptance. Retention planning should prioritise these roles before generic headcount synergies. Integration should protect reporting lines, competence management and independent quality functions.

8. Test the design-to-delivery work flow

Work-package flow begins before induction. Planning, customer records, task cards, material, tooling, access equipment and manpower should be ready before the asset enters the slot. Delays created upstream can consume production facility capacity without creating progress. The buyer should trace representative engineering engineering work packages from quotation and planning through induction, findings, rectification, evidence review, release, invoice and cash.

The trace should identify queues, handoffs, approvals and remediation. Work-in-progress age and blocked tasks are more informative than a headline completion percentage. The buyer should test whether the production system captures reasons for delay consistently and whether planners use those reasons to change schedules.

The digital thread can support selected points in this flow by documenting incoming condition, comparing repeat evidence reviews, locating damage, checking surface state or confirming task evidence. Its use should be specified at task level. Broad claims that AI will accelerate maintenance have limited transaction value without a validated workflow, measurable baseline and accountable decision point.

9. Define the digital thread's bounded role

The digital thread should connect requirements, design definition, analysis, compliance evidence, software, bills of material, manufacturing instructions, supplier records, non-conformance, configuration changes, delivered product and in-service support. Its transaction value comes from traceability and controlled change. A dashboard or replicated database does not establish completeness when the authoritative source, ownership or version is unclear.

The separation team should classify every link by system of record, legal owner, data right, retention duty, export-control status, personal-data status, authorised users, interface, update frequency and fallback. It should identify dependencies on seller identity, networks, licences, keys, cloud tenants, master data, workflows and specialist administrators. Each dependency needs a Day One control and a documented exit route.

Figure 1. Digital-thread dependency map for an aerospace carve-out



Proposed architecture; product, approval and contract-specific controls determine the actual design.

10. Establish engineering-data rights and lineage

A buyer should know who owns each record, who may use it, where it is stored and whether it contains personal, customer, export-controlled or proprietary information. Aircraft condition records can reveal configuration, damage, serial identifiers, facility details or customer operations. Customer contracts and OEM data terms may restrict secondary use or model training.

Lineage should connect record to aircraft or component, task, date, location, device, operator, lighting, calibration, software version, annotation and disposition. Cropping, enhancement or compression should be recorded when material. The original record should remain available under the approved retention process.

The buyer should examine whether the carved-out business has consent and contractual rights for the intended use. A valuable historic record archive can become unusable for machine learning if rights are unclear or labels are unreliable. The carve-out agreement can allocate rights, require delivery of metadata and address claims. Post-close governance should limit reuse to authorised purposes.

Table 3. Engineering-data separation register

Data object	Authoritative source	Required right	Migration proof	Accountable owner
requirements and compliance matrix	approved repository	use, copy and maintain	sampled requirement-to-evidence trace	chief engineer
design definition	product lifecycle system	use and controlled change	baseline and effectivity reconciliation	design authority
software and firmware	source and release repository	compile, modify and support as agreed	reproducible build and signed release	software authority
supplier evidence	supplier portal and quality system	retain and rely on	part-to-supplier record sample	supplier quality
production instructions	manufacturing system	execute and revise within authority	work instruction and configuration sample	production engineering
non-conformance and concessions	quality system	retain, investigate and close	open-item reconciliation	quality director
delivered-product record	configuration archive	retain and support	serial-number completeness test	continuing support lead

11. Validate migration against operating decisions

Model validation should begin with the operational consequence of error. A false positive may create unnecessary evidence review and delay. A false negative may leave a relevant feature unflagged. The acceptable balance depends on whether the model is a search aid, a prioritisation tool or part of a safety-related process. Validation metrics should therefore connect to the actual decision and human review.

The test population should represent aircraft types, component conditions, lighting, cameras, angles, paint schemes, contamination and damage classes expected in production. Rare but consequential defects require specific treatment. Overall accuracy can be misleading when normal records dominate the data. Precision, recall, class-level sensitivity, missing-evidence review, confidence calibration and performance by site should be reported.

UK CAA's MLEAP work highlights data representativeness, generalisation and robustness within machine-learning assurance [7-8]. The buyer should review the development file, test set independence, annotation process, threshold rationale, change control and monitoring plan. A model acquired with the carved-out business has value only if the buyer receives the rights, knowledge and controls required to maintain it.

12. Preserve accountable engineering authority and competence

The approved approved design and production system should state who performs the task, who inspects, who certifies and who can override or reject a model suggestion. The digital thread should not obscure these accountabilities. The user interface should show source record, model output, confidence or limitation where relevant, and the final human disposition.

Inspectors need training in both the engineering or production task and the tool's limitations. They should understand common failure modes, when to seek another method and how to record disagreement. Repeated overrides should be analysed. They can indicate a poorly calibrated model, a new operating condition, weak training or a valuable expert correction.

Human performance should be considered in system design. Automation bias, alert fatigue and loss of manual skill can undermine the intended benefit. The buyer should examine workload, supervision, interface design and recurrent competence. The transaction plan should include qualified operational ownership rather than placing the system solely within an IT team.

13. Audit certification records and product data

UK CAA material for Part 21 addresses design, production and conformity records and continuing-airworthiness records [1-3]. The buyer should test whether the carved-out business can retrieve a complete record for representative work: task instruction, accomplishment, measurement, part or material, tool, authorised engineer, certifying action, deviation and release. The record should reconcile to the customer package and billing.

Digital systems often contain attachments, free text, scanned documents and interfaces. The buyer should test record completeness after export and during outage procedures. It should examine user access, electronic signatures, time stamps, amendments, audit trails and retention. A visually polished dashboard can coexist with incomplete source evidence.

Digital-thread reconciliation outputs should enter the record through a controlled method. The file should identify the software version and keep the underlying record. A system match alone is not an engineering conclusion. The authorised person should record the finding and disposition using approved terminology and procedure.

14. Analyse quality and configuration performance

Quality diligence should examine findings from competent authorities, customers, internal audits, product audits and occurrence reporting. The objective is to understand whether the organisation detects, contains, investigates and corrects problems. A low finding count can reflect strong performance or weak detection; closure quality and recurrence provide more context.

The buyer should stratify findings by severity, process, site, programme, customer and root cause. It should examine overdue corrective actions, repeat findings, concessions, escapes, warranty claims, rejected parts and post-delivery events. Product audits should test the actual work and records, not only procedure compliance.

UK CAA incorporated safety-management-system requirements into Part 21 through ED Decision 2022/011/R [2]. The carved-out business's hazard identification, occurrence reporting, risk assessment and safety assurance should connect to maintenance operations. Technology changes should enter the same change-management and risk processes. An carve-out integration plan should preserve reporting and independent challenge during organisational change.

15. Separate evidence completeness from product conformity

The digital thread can increase the number of features presented for review. Quality performance depends on the entire response: classification, engineering disposition, rectification, reevidence review, release and learning. A higher detection rate can initially increase recorded defects and separation and delivery time. The buyer should avoid treating that increase as evidence of deterioration without examining the underlying change.

The value case should distinguish earlier detection, lower evidence review time, lower repeat evidence review, reduced remediation and improved documentation. These benefits should be measured separately. The baseline should use comparable tasks and conditions. A pilot run on selected clean records cannot support a site-wide synergy assumption.

The buyer should also identify defects that are not visually observable. Internal cracks, material properties, torque, software state and functional performance may require other methods. The digital thread should sit within the evidence review method set, with clear boundaries and escalation to approved non-destructive-testing or engineering processes.

16. Quantify delivery and separation-time drivers

Turnaround time should be decomposed into planned task duration, findings, material wait, engineering response, customer approval, tooling, labour availability, evidence review and release. The buyer should measure elapsed time and active work time. A engineering work package can appear labour efficient while waiting in a production cell and blocking the next induction.

The carved-out business should provide planned and actual milestones for representative checks or component jobs. Diligence should examine schedule changes, omitted tasks, customer additions and reasons for delay. Percentile outcomes and repeated bottlenecks support a more realistic forecast than the mean.

The digital thread may reduce a portion of evidence review and documentation time. The benefit should be applied only to eligible tasks and should include review, exception and system time. The capacity model should then test whether the saved time releases the actual bottleneck. Saving authorised engineer minutes has limited revenue value if the site is constrained by material or production facility access.

Table 2. Digital-thread migration validation and value tests

Test	Evidence	Failure signal	Diligence response
Intended use	Approved process, task map and human authority	Marketing claim exceeds deployed function	Exclude unsupported benefit
Data fitness	Representative records, labels, rights and lineage	Missing defect classes or restricted rights	Remediate data before scale
Performance	Precision, recall, missing-evidence review and site results	Aggregate accuracy hides weak classes	Recalibrate or restrict scope
Workflow value	Baseline time, review time, exceptions and bottleneck	Pilot saving does not release capacity	Remove capacity synergy
Change control	Version, validation, monitoring and rollback	Uncontrolled update or drift	Pause use and investigate

Thresholds require use-case-specific safety, regulatory and operational approval.

17. Test revenue quality and backlog

Revenue should be analysed by customer, programme, service, aircraft or component type, contract form, geography and approval. The buyer should reconcile backlog to executed orders, induction schedules, customer assets and available capacity. Long-term agreements can provide visibility while containing volume discretion, performance credits, benchmarking or termination rights.

Customer approval may be separate from regulatory approval. The carved-out business can hold Part 21 scope and still require airline, lessor, OEM or defence-customer qualification. Change of control, key-person changes, site changes or subcontracting can require consent or renewed audit. The transaction timetable should include these steps.

The buyer should distinguish contracted backlog, forecast call-offs, bids and management pipeline. Margin should include material pass-through, escalation, warranty, liquidated damages, overtime and subcontracting. Backlog that exceeds executable capacity may signal demand strength and also delivery risk. The model should forecast the portion that can be completed, accepted, invoiced and collected.

18. Examine OEM, licensor and supplier dependence

aerospace business economics can depend on access to manuals, production schemes, software, tooling, test equipment, parts and technical support. The buyer should identify agreements with product, engine, component and equipment manufacturers and test whether access survives change of control. It should also identify customer-furnished data and tooling.

UK Competition and Markets Authority decisions in aerospace transactions have examined aftermarket competition, essential inputs and vertical relationships [9-11]. Transaction diligence should map where an OEM or upstream supplier can influence access, price, lead time or customer choice. Competition counsel should determine the relevant legal analysis for the actual transaction.

Supplier concentration should be measured by spend and operational criticality. A low-spend calibrated tool or proprietary part can stop a engineering work package. The buyer should examine alternative sources, lead times, minimum orders, production loops, obsolescence and inventory ownership. Synergy assumptions based on procurement scale should reflect contractual and technical constraints.

19. Assess competition and customer choice

The merger analysis should define candidate product and geographic markets with counsel and economists. Depending on the transaction, relevant dimensions can include aircraft type, engine platform,

component, line or base maintenance, approved process, customer location and response time. Market shares alone may not capture capacity, qualification or switching barriers.

The buyer should identify head-to-head bids, customer overlaps, scarce capabilities and vertical relationships. Internal documents prepared in the ordinary course can provide evidence on competitors and alternatives. A capacity-constrained market can still produce concerns if the combined firm controls a critical input or narrows customer choice.

Remedy risk can affect transaction perimeter, timing and value. The investment case should include the cost of information production, potential hold-separate arrangements, divestment risk and delayed integration. Competition conclusions require transaction-specific legal advice and authority engagement.

20. Rebuild stand-alone EBITDA

Reported EBITDA should be rebuilt from revenue and cost drivers that reconcile to engineering engineering work packages. The buyer should separate material pass-through, labour, contractors, overtime, subcontracting, facilities, tooling, quality cost, warranty, IT and central charges. Accruals and customer claims should be tested against subsequent settlement.

Normalisation should be evidence-led. Temporary underinvestment in training, calibration, tooling, cyber security or facility maintenance should not become a permanent earnings add-back. Unfilled roles may improve current payroll while reducing capacity or control. Technology expenditure may be recurring when models, cameras, storage and validation require continued support.

The buyer should identify quality cost in both visible and hidden forms: remediation, scrap, concession processing, additional evidence review, warranty, customer credits, schedule delay and management time. The technology case should measure reduction in these costs only where the workflow and baseline support it. Carve-out price should not capitalise an unverified benefit twice through both EBITDA and a separate synergy value.

21. Model working capital and cash conversion

aerospace business working capital can build through inventory, rotable pools, unbilled work, disputed findings, milestone acceptance and customer payment terms. The buyer should reconcile physical work progress, approved findings, contractual billing and accounting recognition. Revenue recognition does not itself produce cash.

Work-in-progress ageing should be segmented by customer, site, engineering work package and reason. Material bought for one job may have limited alternative use. Customer-supplied material should remain separately controlled. The buyer should examine deposits, progress payments, retention, warranty reserves and supplier terms.

A reconciled digital-thread record may accelerate customer approval when it makes condition and rectification evidence easier to review. The value should be measured from actual acceptance and dispute outcomes. The purchase agreement should address normal working capital, debt-like items and ageing. Completion accounts or locked-box protections need definitions that reflect the operating model.

22. Build a constraint-based separation-capacity model

The capacity model should represent demand by engineering work package and resources by day or week. Each job consumes production cell, labour skill, certifying authority, tooling, material, evidence review and engineering response. The model should include planned downtime, holidays, training, calibration and maintenance of the facility itself.

The base case should use demonstrated performance. The improvement case should apply specific initiatives with cost and timing. Additional shifts require qualified labour and supervision. New production cells require approvals, tooling and demand. The digital thread requires devices, data rights, integration, validation, training and support. The model should recognise ramp-up and learning.

Reverse stress can identify the combination of delay, lower volume, higher remediation and labour constraint that removes covenant or equity headroom. Management action should be linked to leading indicators. A model that assumes perfect scheduling and immediate productivity improvement will overstate value.

Figure 2. Illustrative annual engineering and production capacity bridge



Values are hypothetical transaction assumptions and do not represent an identified carved-out business.

23. Value digital-thread synergies conservatively

Technology synergy should be built from eligible task volume, observed baseline, validated time or quality improvement, adoption, ramp-up, recurring cost and tax. The buyer should separate cost reduction, capacity release, revenue pull-through, working-capital improvement and risk reduction. These benefits have different evidence and valuation treatment.

Capacity release produces revenue only when demand, customer acceptance, material, labour and other constraints are available. Time saved can instead improve schedule resilience or reduce overtime. Both outcomes can create value, but they should not be combined without evidence. Quality improvement can reduce remediation and warranty while also increasing detection during early deployment.

The technology programme should include cameras, edge devices, storage, network, labelling, integration, model development, assurance, training, support and cyber controls. Continuing validation and change control are operating costs. The buyer should use a probability-weighted value and retain a separate downside case with no technology synergy.

24. Assess UK data, AI and export-control governance

Engineering data can be commercially sensitive, export controlled, customer restricted, personal or safety relevant. The separation plan should identify the lawful basis and contractual right for transfer, storage, access, replication, migration and continued use. Technical-data rights should be traced to contracts, licences, approvals and employee or supplier arrangements. Physical location alone does not establish a right to use the data.

UK export controls can apply to military and dual-use goods, software and technology, including technical assistance and electronic transfer. The classification, destination, end user, purpose, persons receiving access and proposed onward transfer require transaction-specific assessment [10-11]. The National Security and Investment Act can require mandatory notification for qualifying acquisitions in sensitive sectors, including defence, where statutory tests are met [12].

Personal-data migration should follow UK GDPR accountability, purpose limitation, minimisation, security and transparency requirements. The ICO's data-sharing guidance emphasises due diligence, documentation and appropriate controls [13]. AI-assisted search, classification or reconciliation should use approved data, logged access, validated outputs and accountable human review. It should not create a new uncontrolled copy of the certification record.

25. Review cyber and operational resilience

An aerospace business technology stack can connect planning, design, production and conformity records, tooling, stores, customer portals and analytical systems. The buyer should map networks, identities, privileged access, remote support, backups, recovery and third parties. The assessment should distinguish systems needed for safe maintenance and release from convenience applications.

Digital-thread separation adds repositories, interfaces, identity controls, storage and reconciliation services. Each component creates configuration, patching and access responsibilities. Offline and degraded procedures should allow work to continue safely and preserve records. A cloud outage should not erase the source record or final disposition.

The transaction plan should include security testing, credential changes, vendor access review, backup verification and incident coordination. Integration should avoid rushed network connection before risk is understood. Cyber findings should translate into completion conditions, remediation budgets, insurance review or contractual protection where material.

26. Test accounting and purchase-price effects

The buyer should assess acquired contracts, customer relationships, technology, licences, order backlog, property, tooling, inventory and liabilities under applicable accounting standards. IFRS 3 requires recognition and measurement in a business combination according to its requirements [13]. Valuation specialists should determine actual treatment.

Technology value should reflect legal rights, expected economic benefit, obsolescence, maintenance cost and remaining useful life. Internally developed models can depend on people and data that are not separately transferable. Customer relationships may be affected by approval, platform and change-of-control conditions.

Provisions and contingent liabilities can arise from warranties, disputes, environmental matters, employment, tax and regulatory events. Purchase-price allocation does not determine transaction price. The board should keep accounting valuation, commercial valuation and negotiated risk allocation connected but distinct.

27. Design transaction and TSA protections

Transaction protections should map directly to unresolved evidence. Conditions can address regulatory and investment approvals, material customer consents, critical licences, approval-change acceptance and specified data-transfer readiness. Warranties can address ownership, completeness, accuracy, authority correspondence, product conformity, records, intellectual property, systems, cyber incidents and contractual compliance. Specific indemnities may be appropriate for identified historic exposures, subject to legal advice.

The TSA should be a controlled bridge. Each service needs scope, service level, capacity, security classification, data owner, change process, cost, dependency, incident response, termination assistance and an objective exit test. The buyer should reject a nominal end date when the replacement system, data or trained people cannot be evidenced.

Table 5. Transition-services exit schedule

Service	Day One control	Exit evidence	Illustrative target	Failure response
product lifecycle management	segregated access and baseline freeze	reconciled configuration and approved workflow	month 12	extend service and defer milestone
certification repository	named custodians and immutable copy	completeness sample and authority acceptance where required	month 9	remediation team and holdback
enterprise resource planning	controlled master data and interfaces	order-to-cash and inventory reconciliation	month 15	dual run and cost recovery
identity and cyber monitoring	least privilege and seller log feed	independent environment and tested incident response	month 6	restrict access and escalate
supplier quality portal	continued supplier evidence access	supplier migration and traceability test	month 12	seller support and alternative evidence
engineering support	named experts and response levels	trained buyer team and accepted authority matrix	month 18	staged transfer and retention remedy

Illustrative structure; timing and evidence depend on the actual systems, approvals and contracts.

Figure 3. Illustrative TSA and separation roadmap



Wholly hypothetical timetable; no transaction outcome is forecast.

28. Protect people and independent control functions

The value of an carved-out aerospace business depends heavily on licensed, authorised and experienced people. The buyer should map retention risk by role and site, examine labour agreements, pension or benefit commitments and understand local consultation requirements. Communications should protect customer confidence and safety reporting.

Synergy plans often carved-out business duplicated corporate functions. Quality, safety, compliance, engineering and training functions require careful assessment before reduction or consolidation. Independence and competent staffing may be required by the approved system. Vacancies can affect both output and oversight.

Retention arrangements should focus on transaction continuity and capability transfer. Knowledge should be documented through procedures, authorisation records, training and structured handover. The buyer should avoid dependence on one executive as a substitute for an institutional control system.

29. Plan Day One and the first hundred days

Day One should confirm legal ownership, accountable leadership, regulatory status, customer communications, banking, insurance, system access, reporting and incident escalation. The buyer should use a controlled readiness checklist for each entity and site. Unresolved items should have temporary controls and an authorised owner.

The first hundred days should stabilise approvals, people, customers and production before major system consolidation. Work-package flow, quality findings, cash and staff turnover should be monitored weekly. Technology pilots should remain within approved boundaries and should have rollback procedures.

Integration governance should separate decisions requiring authority or customer acceptance from internal management actions. A central value-capture office can track synergies while quality and safety leaders retain independent escalation. The board should receive both value and control indicators.

Table 3. Illustrative hundred-day integration plan

Period	Operational priority	Technology priority	Board evidence
Day 1-10	Confirm approvals, leadership, incident routes and customer continuity	Freeze uncontrolled changes and confirm access	Readiness exceptions and accountable owners
Day 11-30	Protect schedule, staff and critical suppliers	Validate data rights, inventory and pilot boundaries	Capacity, quality and cash baseline
Day 31-60	Resolve bottlenecks and aged work-in-progress	Run controlled validation on eligible tasks	Model results, overrides and workflow impact
Day 61-100	Approve scalable productivity and quality actions	Decide scale, redesign or stop	Verified value case and residual risks

Timing is illustrative and must reflect the actual authority, employee and customer process.

30. Build the illustrative carve-out case

The hypothetical carved-out business operates three UK sites with six engineering and production cells and selected component capability. The case assumes GBP 310 million revenue, GBP 43 million adjusted EBITDA, 1,480 employees and enterprise value of GBP 470 million. The proposed programme includes GBP 27 million for tooling, workflow integration and controlled digital-thread separation.

Management assumptions include eighty-one percent scheduled production cell utilisation, seventy-four percent delivered utilisation after constraints, average engineering work-package completion of thirty-two days and GBP 46 million of working capital. The base case assumes stable approvals and customer retention. The downside case assumes lower induction volume, six additional separation and delivery days, higher agency labour, delayed material and no technology synergy. The severe case adds a major customer loss and regulatory remediation cost.

These values exist only to demonstrate the framework. A real transaction requires audited financial information, quality and occurrence evidence, authority and customer correspondence, contracts, workforce data, facility review, technology validation, environmental diligence, legal analysis and competition assessment.

31. Translate evidence into valuation

The base enterprise value of GBP 470 million represents 10.0 times illustrative adjusted EBITDA. The buyer should challenge both the earnings and the multiple. A lower maintainable EBITDA may result from normalised quality, labour, capex or central costs. A premium may be supported by scarce capability, customer durability and demonstrable capacity.

The value bridge should show operating improvement separately from technology. The illustrative case attributes GBP 3.2 million of potential annual benefit to scheduling and bottleneck removal, GBP 2.1 million to quality and remediation, and GBP 1.6 million to evidence review and documentation efficiency at scale. Implementation cost, adoption, delay and overlap reduce the probability-weighted value.

The buyer should also value downside protection. Earlier defect identification or better records can reduce extreme loss exposure without producing a predictable annual EBITDA figure. This benefit may justify investment while remaining outside the headline synergy commitment. Price should reflect current evidence; deferred mechanisms can share value that remains conditional.

Figure 4. Illustrative EBITDA and separation bridge



Values are hypothetical assumptions and do not represent an identified carved-out business or offer.

32. Use scenario and reverse-stress analysis

The base, downside and severe cases should vary volume, price, labour, material, separation and delivery, remediation, customer retention, capex, integration and technology delivery. Correlations matter. A labour shortage can slow work, increase overtime and weaken quality simultaneously. Material delay can occupy production cells and defer billing.

Reverse stress should identify the operational conditions that exhaust liquidity or breach financing headroom. It can express the maximum combination of lost inductions, extra days and lower margin that the capital structure supports. Management actions should have evidence, lead time and authority.

The carve-out financing should preserve liquidity for quality and approval obligations. An aggressive cash sweep can constrain the investment required to protect the asset. Debt sizing should reflect maintainable cash flow, working-capital volatility, capex and downside. Lenders should assess the operating evidence independently.

Figure 5. Illustrative separation risk heat map



Hypothetical assessment for framework demonstration; transaction evidence determines actual ratings.

33. Establish post-close monitoring

The board dashboard should connect approvals, people, capacity, quality, customers, cash and technology. Suggested indicators include approval actions, staff authorisation gaps, delivered controlled work-package days, separation and delivery percentiles, blocked work, remediation, repeat findings, warranty, backlog conversion, work-in-progress ageing, cash collection and model overrides.

Thresholds should trigger investigation rather than create automatic conclusions. A rise in recorded defects after a new evidence review tool may indicate improved detection. A fall in separation and delivery may result from a lighter work mix. The dashboard should preserve the underlying denominator and operational explanation.

Technology monitoring should include use rate, eligible-task coverage, false positives, reviewed false negatives, override reasons, performance by site and version changes. Quality and safety leaders should be able to suspend use. The value-capture office should count benefits only after the operational and financial evidence reconciles.

34. Recognise the framework's limits

No diligence framework can guarantee approval continuity, evidence reconciliation, customer retention, technology performance, transaction value or financial return. Records can be incomplete, models can fail under new conditions and integration can change behaviour. Regulatory and customer decisions remain outside the buyer's control.

The digital thread cannot inspect every defect or replace required methods, licensed judgement or approved release. Its value depends on a narrow intended use, fit data, validated performance, controlled integration and competent people. The illustrative case cannot be applied directly to an actual carve-out.

The framework's purpose is to make the carve-out thesis testable. It separates observed evidence from assumptions, links operational constraints to financial consequences and assigns unresolved issues to a transaction or integration response. Specialist advice and transaction-specific evidence remain essential.

35. Conclusion

UK aerospace carve-out M&A should be underwritten from the chain that converts approval, people, facilities, tooling and records into accepted work and collected cash. The buyer should value deliverable capacity rather than nominal floor space, and verified quality rather than a low headline finding count. Revenue and EBITDA gain credibility when they reconcile to engineering engineering work packages and approvals.

The digital thread can support engineering and separation capacity and quality by improving capture, comparison, prioritisation and traceability. Its role should remain bounded, with authorised personnel retaining evidence review and release responsibilities. The strongest deployment connects representative data, validated performance, human oversight, record retention, cyber control and change management.

Transaction value follows when the buyer identifies the actual bottleneck, verifies the improvement mechanism, funds the required programme and allocates residual risk. Price, agreement protections, retention and the hundred-day plan should reflect the evidence. This discipline turns a broad technology claim into a controlled operating and M&A decision.

Figure 6. Illustrative carve-out value under operating and technology outcomes



Values are hypothetical transaction assumptions and do not represent an identified carved-out business or valuation.

Table 4. Carve-out decision matrix

Finding	Financial consequence	Transaction response	Post-close owner
Approval or customer-consent uncertainty	Revenue and completion risk	Condition, covenant or perimeter adjustment	Regulatory and commercial lead
Constrained authorised engineering and quality staff	Lower deliverable capacity and higher labour cost	Retention, price adjustment and recruitment plan	Accountable manager and HR
Weak record rights or model validation	Unsupported technology value	Exclude synergy and require remediation	Technology and quality leads
High remediation and aged work-in-progress	Margin and cash conversion risk	Working-capital protection and quality programme	COO and CFO
OEM or critical-supplier dependence	Access, price and continuity risk	Consent, supply agreement or specific protection	Procurement and legal leads

The matrix illustrates allocation of findings and does not constitute legal or investment advice.

Frequently asked questions

What should a buyer verify first in a UK aerospace carve-out?

The buyer should reconcile the legal perimeter to approval scope, product responsibility, authorised people, engineering systems, certification evidence, customer contracts and actual work. This establishes whether the carved-out business can continue to design, produce, support and deliver the revenue included in valuation.

Do UK aerospace approvals transfer automatically with the shares or assets?

Approval treatment depends on the legal and operating changes. UK CAA guidance generally excludes transfer, with limited continuity in an ownership transfer where the approved organisation remains effectively unchanged. Changes to facilities, work, people or accountable management can require prior approval or a new investigation. Transaction-specific engagement with the UK CAA and advisers is required.

What belongs in a certification-lineage map?

It should connect the approved design basis, compliance evidence, configuration baseline, approved changes, production instructions, supplier evidence, conformity records, release documentation and delivered-product record. Each link should identify the authoritative source, owner, access right, version and retention duty.

How should the digital thread be separated?

The team should identify systems of record, interfaces, identities, licences, data rights, authoritative versions, migration rules, reconciliation tests and fallbacks. Completion requires evidence that the buyer can operate controlled workflows without hidden seller dependencies.

What should a transition-services agreement cover?

It should define scope, service level, capacity, security, access, data ownership, change control, incident response, cost, termination assistance and objective exit evidence for each service. A calendar date alone does not prove readiness.

How should separation risk enter valuation?

The model should quantify stand-alone costs, duplicated systems, transition expenditure, stranded costs, delivery disruption, remediation, customer consequences, working capital and the timing of TSA exits. The downside should remove unproven synergies and include delayed regulatory or data migration.

Which engineering-data rights need confirmation?

Rights may be required to use, copy, migrate, modify, compile, support, disclose and retain requirements, design definition, software, certification evidence, production data and supplier records. The governing contract, licence, approval and export-control position should support the proposed operating model.

What should the board monitor after completion?

The board should monitor approval actions, authoritative-role coverage, configuration reconciliation, record completeness, delivery performance, customer consents, system migration, cyber incidents, stand-alone cost, working capital and TSA exit evidence. Each metric should retain its denominator, source and accountable owner.

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