In-Orbit Servicing M&A: Buying Robotics, Rendezvous or Customer Access

A Capability, Contract and Integration Framework for Acquiring Space-Servicing Platforms

Authored by Chennakeshav Adya

Independent Researcher

September 2026

Abstract

In-orbit servicing acquisitions combine three very different assets: physical robotics that can interact with a client spacecraft, rendezvous and proximity operations capability that can reach and approach it safely, and customer access that can turn those capabilities into funded missions. A buyer can acquire one layer and discover after closing that the other two remain scarce, incompatible or controlled by counterparties. The central transaction question is therefore not whether the target owns impressive technology. It is whether the acquired perimeter contains a complete, transferable and financeable route from mission need to accepted service and collected cash.

This paper develops a Capability, Contract and Integration Framework for acquisitions involving space robotics, autonomous rendezvous, satellite life extension, relocation, refuelling, inspection, active debris removal and related in-space servicing. The framework decomposes value into six linked layers: mission rights and customer access; rendezvous and proximity operations; relative navigation and autonomy; capture, docking and robotic manipulation; servicing payload and spacecraft platform; and ground, regulatory and operating infrastructure. It then tests technical evidence, interface ownership, intellectual-property transfer, data rights, contract quality, security screening, export controls, key-person dependency, integration cost and funding through the first combined mission.

Current public evidence shows both opportunity and execution risk. NASA's 2025 ISAM State of Play describes 11 capability areas and records a broad developer and facility base. GAO reported in July 2025 that robotic servicing remained far from routine, that demand was fragmented, that flight-test opportunities were limited and that regulation and standards were still emerging. ESA's RISE mission contract with D-Orbit connects specialised rendezvous, sensors, computers and docking equipment to a planned commercial servicing vehicle. ESA's ClearSpace-1 and JAXA's Commercial Removal of Debris Demonstration show how public procurement can create mission access while leaving technology, schedule and funding risks to be resolved. NASA's cancellation of OSAM-1 demonstrates that accumulated development spending and sophisticated robotics do not guarantee a transition to an operational service. These records concern named programmes and cannot establish the value of an unidentified acquisition target. [1][2][3][4][5][6][7]

The worked case is wholly hypothetical. A strategic buyer evaluates a target with autonomous rendezvous software, a robotic capture mechanism, one completed inspection mission, one funded demonstration contract and three non-binding customer memoranda. The framework admits USD 52 million of standalone probability-weighted mission value, USD 18 million for controlled robotics and interface intellectual property, USD 22 million for transferable rendezvous software and flight data, USD 16 million for qualified customer access and USD 20 million of buyer-specific operating and sales synergies. It deducts USD 17 million for platform and integration work, USD 11 million for change-of-control and export-control exposure, USD 9 million for customer conversion risk and USD 7 million for remaining

funding. The resulting illustrative enterprise value is USD 84 million. The proposed consideration is USD 56 million at closing and up to USD 28 million released against configuration-specific integration, customer acceptance and collected-cash milestones. Every amount, probability and synergy requires transaction-specific evidence.

The framework is intended for boards, founders, strategic aerospace groups, satellite operators, defence and civil contractors, private equity and growth investors, sovereign and family-office capital, lenders and government customers. It directs acquisition price toward capabilities, rights and customer economics that transfer at closing. It places unproven interoperability, market conversion and mission outcomes into integration budgets, conditions precedent, holdbacks and contingent consideration.

JEL Classification: G32, G34, L64, L93, O31, O32

Keywords: in-orbit servicing M&A, space robotics acquisition, rendezvous proximity operations, satellite servicing, customer access, space technology diligence, capability integration, export controls, national security screening, contingent consideration

Introduction

In-orbit servicing is a system of systems. A mission may require target identification, trajectory design, guidance and navigation, command authority, autonomous collision avoidance, capture or docking hardware, propulsion, manipulation, communications, ground operations, licensing, insurance and customer acceptance. The provider also needs a client asset that can be approached legally and technically, a customer willing to accept operational risk, and enough funding to survive qualification, launch and mission delay.

M&A can accelerate access to one or more of these capabilities. A spacecraft manufacturer may buy rendezvous autonomy. A satellite operator may buy customer-facing servicing capacity. A defence prime may buy robotic manipulation and secure operations. A servicing company may buy a customer portfolio or a mission contract. The acquisition thesis can fail when the purchased capability cannot be transferred, integrated or sold inside the buyer's architecture and regulatory perimeter.

The correct unit of analysis is the combined mission chain. The buyer should identify each controlled interface, each external dependency and each value-changing evidence point from signing through collected service cash. The paper therefore treats robotics, rendezvous and customer access as separable but interdependent assets. It uses a mission architecture, contract waterfall, integration plan and probability-weighted value bridge to convert them into a board decision.

1. Define the acquisition decision

The central diligence issue concerns the buyer's strategic objective, valuation date, acquired perimeter, target mission classes and permitted synergies. The evidence set should begin with board mandate, target cap table, transaction perimeter, product roadmap, mission plan and buyer integration thesis. Successful tests, anomalies, waivers and unresolved work belong in the same record.

The required analytical output is one board-approved acquisition question and evidence cut-off. Link each conclusion to mission probability, integration schedule, cost, funding, customer acceptance and cash collection. A technical asset has transaction value when the buyer can control, transfer, integrate and use it in an authorised mission.

For the transaction, the board should state whether the transaction buys time, technical capability, contracts, market access or a complete operating platform. A transaction described as platform consolidation may in practice acquire only personnel and prototypes. The decision paper should state the missing elements and their funded route to mission use. Identify base value, contingent value, integration

investment, downside liquidity and contractual protection. State which conclusion changes if a customer, licence, employee, supplier or mission milestone fails to transfer.

2. Choose the acquisition archetype

The central diligence issue concerns whether the buyer is acquiring robotics, rendezvous autonomy, customer access or an integrated provider. The evidence set should begin with system architecture, mission concepts, contract register, customer interviews, intellectual-property schedule and organisation chart. Successful tests, anomalies, waivers and unresolved work belong in the same record.

The required analytical output is an archetype map with acquired and missing capability layers. Link each conclusion to mission probability, integration schedule, cost, funding, customer acceptance and cash collection. A technical asset has transaction value when the buyer can control, transfer, integrate and use it in an authorised mission.

For the transaction, the board should price each layer separately and identify the party responsible for completing the chain. A robotics acquisition can reduce payload-development time while leaving navigation, licensing and customer conversion untouched. A customer-access acquisition can add pipeline while leaving mission delivery dependent on third parties. Identify base value, contingent value, integration investment, downside liquidity and contractual protection. State which conclusion changes if a customer, licence, employee, supplier or mission milestone fails to transfer.

3. Map the combined mission architecture

The central diligence issue concerns the technical and contractual sequence from customer need to completed service. The evidence set should begin with concept of operations, interface-control documents, trajectory models, software architecture, operations procedures and customer acceptance criteria. Successful tests, anomalies, waivers and unresolved work belong in the same record.

The required analytical output is a mission chain with owned, licensed and externally supplied elements. Link each conclusion to mission probability, integration schedule, cost, funding, customer acceptance and cash collection. A technical asset has transaction value when the buyer can control, transfer, integrate and use it in an authorised mission.

For the transaction, the board should reject synergies that require interfaces or rights absent from the acquired perimeter. Architecture maps should include failure recovery, disposal and data delivery. The same hardware can carry different risk when used against a cooperative client, an unprepared legacy satellite or non-cooperative debris. Identify base value, contingent value, integration investment, downside liquidity and contractual protection. State which conclusion changes if a customer, licence, employee, supplier or mission milestone fails to transfer.

4. Separate robotics from mission completion

The central diligence issue concerns the manipulation function and its dependence on perception, navigation, control and target compatibility. The evidence set should begin with robot-arm test data, end-effector qualification, force-torque telemetry, target geometry, structural limits and fault-management records. Successful tests, anomalies, waivers and unresolved work belong in the same record.

The required analytical output is a robotics evidence matrix tied to specific tasks and targets. Link each conclusion to mission probability, integration schedule, cost, funding, customer acceptance and cash collection. A technical asset has transaction value when the buyer can control, transfer, integrate and use it in an authorised mission.

For the transaction, the board should credit robotics only for operations demonstrated or supported by relevant qualification. A flight-qualified manipulator may still need a new tool, control law or structural

interface. The buyer should value the reusable subsystem and separately fund mission-specific engineering. Identify base value, contingent value, integration investment, downside liquidity and contractual protection. State which conclusion changes if a customer, licence, employee, supplier or mission milestone fails to transfer.

5. Diligence rendezvous and proximity operations

The central diligence issue concerns relative navigation, approach corridors, collision avoidance, autonomy, command authority and abort logic. The evidence set should begin with flight telemetry, simulation coverage, hardware-in-the-loop testing, navigation sensor performance, anomaly logs and independent review. Successful tests, anomalies, waivers and unresolved work belong in the same record.

The required analytical output is a phase-by-phase probability and safety case. Link each conclusion to mission probability, integration schedule, cost, funding, customer acceptance and cash collection. A technical asset has transaction value when the buyer can control, transfer, integrate and use it in an authorised mission.

For the transaction, the board should require evidence for the intended orbit, target behaviour, lighting, communications and operating distance. Rendezvous heritage transfers weakly when the next mission changes from a cooperative target to tumbling debris, from low Earth orbit to geostationary orbit, or from supervised to autonomous operations. Identify base value, contingent value, integration investment, downside liquidity and contractual protection. State which conclusion changes if a customer, licence, employee, supplier or mission milestone fails to transfer.

6. Value autonomy and flight data

The central diligence issue concerns the algorithms, labelled datasets, simulation environments and operational learning that improve mission performance. The evidence set should begin with source-code repositories, model documentation, data lineage, access controls, training rights, telemetry archives and configuration history. Successful tests, anomalies, waivers and unresolved work belong in the same record.

The required analytical output is a controlled-asset register with buyer use cases. Link each conclusion to mission probability, integration schedule, cost, funding, customer acceptance and cash collection. A technical asset has transaction value when the buyer can control, transfer, integrate and use it in an authorised mission.

For the transaction, the board should discount assets whose rights, provenance or configuration cannot be established. Flight data can shorten testing and improve navigation models. Its value depends on legal control, target permissions, representative conditions and the buyer's ability to use it after closing. Identify base value, contingent value, integration investment, downside liquidity and contractual protection. State which conclusion changes if a customer, licence, employee, supplier or mission milestone fails to transfer.

7. Test capture, docking and mating interfaces

The central diligence issue concerns mechanical compatibility, target preparation, loads, tolerances, sensing, latching and release. The evidence set should begin with interface-control documents, test articles, qualification reports, docking trials, target-owner approvals and standards mapping. Successful tests, anomalies, waivers and unresolved work belong in the same record.

The required analytical output is an interface-compatibility matrix by mission class. Link each conclusion to mission probability, integration schedule, cost, funding, customer acceptance and cash collection. A technical asset has transaction value when the buyer can control, transfer, integrate and use it in an authorised mission.

For the transaction, the board should treat each new target family as an explicit engineering and qualification branch. A universal-looking capture concept may rely on a launch adapter ring, prepared plate or geometry unavailable on the addressable fleet. The acquisition model should distinguish prepared and unprepared clients. Identify base value, contingent value, integration investment, downside liquidity and contractual protection. State which conclusion changes if a customer, licence, employee, supplier or mission milestone fails to transfer.

8. Reconstruct customer access

The central diligence issue concerns whether the target controls a funded customer relationship, a procurement position, an option or only a non-binding expression of interest. The evidence set should begin with executed contracts, statements of work, framework agreements, memoranda, budget evidence, invoices, collections and customer confirmations. Successful tests, anomalies, waivers and unresolved work belong in the same record.

The required analytical output is a customer-rights waterfall from announcement to collected contribution. Link each conclusion to mission probability, integration schedule, cost, funding, customer acceptance and cash collection. A technical asset has transaction value when the buyer can control, transfer, integrate and use it in an authorised mission.

For the transaction, the board should exclude non-binding pipeline from contracted value and identify change-of-control consent. Government-sponsored demonstrations can create flight opportunity and credibility. They may include cost share, milestone acceptance, termination rights and restrictions that limit transfer to the buyer. Identify base value, contingent value, integration investment, downside liquidity and contractual protection. State which conclusion changes if a customer, licence, employee, supplier or mission milestone fails to transfer.

9. Distinguish customer relationships from mission rights

The central diligence issue concerns the legal and operational rights required to approach, inspect, dock with, manipulate or relocate a client spacecraft. The evidence set should begin with client authorisations, operator licences, command protocols, insurance terms, data-use rights and mission-specific approvals. Successful tests, anomalies, waivers and unresolved work belong in the same record.

The required analytical output is a rights matrix for each forecast mission. Link each conclusion to mission probability, integration schedule, cost, funding, customer acceptance and cash collection. A technical asset has transaction value when the buyer can control, transfer, integrate and use it in an authorised mission.

For the transaction, the board should require a complete rights path before counting a customer as executable backlog. A relationship with an operator does not itself grant control authority or approval for close approach. The customer may also lack the technical data needed to support servicing of an older spacecraft. Identify base value, contingent value, integration investment, downside liquidity and contractual protection. State which conclusion changes if a customer, licence, employee, supplier or mission milestone fails to transfer.

10. Build the contract waterfall

The central diligence issue concerns the conversion of announced awards and pipeline into funded, executable and collectible cash. The evidence set should begin with signed scope, appropriations, purchase orders, milestone schedule, termination clauses, acceptance conditions, cost-to-complete and billing history. Successful tests, anomalies, waivers and unresolved work belong in the same record.

The required analytical output is risk-adjusted contract contribution after fulfilment cost. Link each conclusion to mission probability, integration schedule, cost, funding, customer acceptance and cash collection. A technical asset has transaction value when the buyer can control, transfer, integrate and use it in an authorised mission.

For the transaction, the board should reconcile every headline contract amount to funded scope and cash economics. Backlog should exclude unfunded options and amounts controlled by future task orders. Launch, customer availability and successful service can each sit before acceptance and payment. Identify base value, contingent value, integration investment, downside liquidity and contractual protection. State which conclusion changes if a customer, licence, employee, supplier or mission milestone fails to transfer.

11. Assess standards and interoperability

The central diligence issue concerns the extent to which the acquired capability uses open, accepted or proprietary interfaces. The evidence set should begin with standards mapping, interface-control documents, licence terms, customer fleet data and supplier roadmaps. Successful tests, anomalies, waivers and unresolved work belong in the same record.

The required analytical output is an interoperability score and retrofit requirement. Link each conclusion to mission probability, integration schedule, cost, funding, customer acceptance and cash collection. A technical asset has transaction value when the buyer can control, transfer, integrate and use it in an authorised mission.

For the transaction, the board should treat proprietary lock-in as value only when the buyer controls the ecosystem and customer economics. Standardisation can expand addressable missions and reduce non-recurring engineering. It can also commoditise a component. The value model should separate market expansion from margin pressure. Identify base value, contingent value, integration investment, downside liquidity and contractual protection. State which conclusion changes if a customer, licence, employee, supplier or mission milestone fails to transfer.

12. Audit intellectual-property ownership

The central diligence issue concerns patents, software, designs, trade secrets, flight data, background rights and third-party licences. The evidence set should begin with employment agreements, invention assignments, contractor terms, licence files, grant conditions, open-source register and chain of title. Successful tests, anomalies, waivers and unresolved work belong in the same record.

The required analytical output is an IP schedule connected to each valued capability. Link each conclusion to mission probability, integration schedule, cost, funding, customer acceptance and cash collection. A technical asset has transaction value when the buyer can control, transfer, integrate and use it in an authorised mission.

For the transaction, the board should make clean transfer of critical rights a closing condition. Space programmes often blend company, agency, university, supplier and customer contributions. The buyer should identify restrictions on commercialisation, export, sublicensing and use outside the original mission. Identify base value, contingent value, integration investment, downside liquidity and contractual protection. State which conclusion changes if a customer, licence, employee, supplier or mission milestone fails to transfer.

13. Map export controls and technology transfer

The central diligence issue concerns the movement of spacecraft, servicing technology, software, technical data and controlled access across people and jurisdictions. The evidence set should begin with EAR and

ITAR classification, licences, technology-control plans, nationality matrix, data rooms and facility controls. Successful tests, anomalies, waivers and unresolved work belong in the same record.

The required analytical output is a transaction-specific transfer and operating plan. Link each conclusion to mission probability, integration schedule, cost, funding, customer acceptance and cash collection. A technical asset has transaction value when the buyer can control, transfer, integrate and use it in an authorised mission.

For the transaction, the board should treat unavailable licences or restricted access as a condition, carve-out or integration cost. U.S. rules expressly address transfers of ownership or control of certain servicing spacecraft. Cross-border integration can affect source-code access, technical support, staffing and customer eligibility. Identify base value, contingent value, integration investment, downside liquidity and contractual protection. State which conclusion changes if a customer, licence, employee, supplier or mission milestone fails to transfer.

14. Screen national-security and foreign-investment risk

The central diligence issue concerns whether control, material influence, sensitive capability, government contracts or critical technology triggers review. The evidence set should begin with ownership chain, investor rights, target activities, customer base, sensitive data, facility access and government guidance. Successful tests, anomalies, waivers and unresolved work belong in the same record.

The required analytical output is a jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction filing and mitigation plan. Link each conclusion to mission probability, integration schedule, cost, funding, customer acceptance and cash collection. A technical asset has transaction value when the buyer can control, transfer, integrate and use it in an authorised mission.

For the transaction, the board should include timing, information segregation and potential remedies in the deal case. UK guidance places in-orbit servicing, robotics, debris management and operational-control infrastructure inside the satellite and space technology area. U.S. review can also intersect with export controls and classified work. Identify base value, contingent value, integration investment, downside liquidity and contractual protection. State which conclusion changes if a customer, licence, employee, supplier or mission milestone fails to transfer.

15. Test licences, liability and insurance

The central diligence issue concerns mission authorisation, supervision, collision exposure, target damage, third-party loss, re-entry and contractual indemnity. The evidence set should begin with licences, regulator correspondence, launch-state analysis, insurance policies, customer contracts and counsel opinions. Successful tests, anomalies, waivers and unresolved work belong in the same record.

The required analytical output is a mission liability and coverage schedule. Link each conclusion to mission probability, integration schedule, cost, funding, customer acceptance and cash collection. A technical asset has transaction value when the buyer can control, transfer, integrate and use it in an authorised mission.

For the transaction, the board should deduct uninsured or uncapped exposure and preserve compliant post-mission disposal. Change of control can require regulator or customer engagement. A buyer acquiring technology without the operating approvals may own an asset that cannot yet perform the forecast service. Identify base value, contingent value, integration investment, downside liquidity and contractual protection. State which conclusion changes if a customer, licence, employee, supplier or mission milestone fails to transfer.

16. Assess people and tacit knowledge

The central diligence issue concerns the engineers, flight directors, safety leads, customer executives and programme managers required to operate the acquired capability. The evidence set should begin with organisation chart, role descriptions, retention history, compensation, succession, mission logs and interview evidence. Successful tests, anomalies, waivers and unresolved work belong in the same record.

The required analytical output is a key-person and knowledge-transfer plan. Link each conclusion to mission probability, integration schedule, cost, funding, customer acceptance and cash collection. A technical asset has transaction value when the buyer can control, transfer, integrate and use it in an authorised mission.

For the transaction, the board should fund retention and require documented transfer of critical operating knowledge. Robotics and autonomy value may reside in teams that understand failure modes, configuration history and operational judgement. Repositories alone rarely capture every mission constraint. Identify base value, contingent value, integration investment, downside liquidity and contractual protection. State which conclusion changes if a customer, licence, employee, supplier or mission milestone fails to transfer.

17. Identify platform and interface integration

The central diligence issue concerns bus compatibility, power, thermal, data, flight software, cyber security, operations, launch and ground systems. The evidence set should begin with buyer and target architectures, interface tests, software bills of materials, cyber assessments and supplier commitments. Successful tests, anomalies, waivers and unresolved work belong in the same record.

The required analytical output is an integration work breakdown with owners, cost and schedule. Link each conclusion to mission probability, integration schedule, cost, funding, customer acceptance and cash collection. A technical asset has transaction value when the buyer can control, transfer, integrate and use it in an authorised mission.

For the transaction, the board should separate necessary integration from claimed cost synergies. Combining two proven subsystems can create a new unproven system. The integration plan should reopen relevant verification and validation rather than assuming the sum inherits both flight histories. Identify base value, contingent value, integration investment, downside liquidity and contractual protection. State which conclusion changes if a customer, licence, employee, supplier or mission milestone fails to transfer.

18. Model integration probability

The central diligence issue concerns the conditional path from closing to an integrated, licensed, launched and accepted mission. The evidence set should begin with technical reviews, supplier plans, customer dependencies, launch windows, regulatory timetable and funding plan. Successful tests, anomalies, waivers and unresolved work belong in the same record.

The required analytical output is a probability-weighted integration tree. Link each conclusion to mission probability, integration schedule, cost, funding, customer acceptance and cash collection. A technical asset has transaction value when the buyer can control, transfer, integrate and use it in an authorised mission.

For the transaction, the board should multiply dependent stages and preserve correlated failure modes. One blended execution discount hides the interaction between schedule, cash, customer availability and technical rework. Each branch should carry its own cost, timing and recovery path. Identify base value, contingent value, integration investment, downside liquidity and contractual protection. State which conclusion changes if a customer, licence, employee, supplier or mission milestone fails to transfer.

19. Reconcile development cost and replacement cost

The central diligence issue concerns historical spending, usable assets, remaining work and the buyer's make-versus-buy alternative. The evidence set should begin with general ledger, programme accounts, test assets, code base, supplier quotes and buyer internal estimates. Successful tests, anomalies, waivers and unresolved work belong in the same record.

The required analytical output is a replacement-cost cross-check adjusted for obsolescence and failed work. Link each conclusion to mission probability, integration schedule, cost, funding, customer acceptance and cash collection. A technical asset has transaction value when the buyer can control, transfer, integrate and use it in an authorised mission.

For the transaction, the board should avoid treating sunk cost as market value. NASA's OSAM-1 experience illustrates that large accumulated spend can coexist with schedule, integration and transition problems. The buyer should value reusable capability and time saved, not reimbursed history. Identify base value, contingent value, integration investment, downside liquidity and contractual protection. State which conclusion changes if a customer, licence, employee, supplier or mission milestone fails to transfer.

20. Build mission-level economics

The central diligence issue concerns service price, launch, hardware, payload, operations, insurance, licensing, ground network, working capital and disposal. The evidence set should begin with customer scope, supplier quotes, engineering plan, mission simulations, historical actuals and payment terms. Successful tests, anomalies, waivers and unresolved work belong in the same record.

The required analytical output is gross contribution and cash by mission class. Link each conclusion to mission probability, integration schedule, cost, funding, customer acceptance and cash collection. A technical asset has transaction value when the buyer can control, transfer, integrate and use it in an authorised mission.

For the transaction, the board should show economics before and after the acquisition integration. Customer access can be valuable when it raises utilisation or reduces selling time. The model should still account for mission-specific engineering and the probability that the customer remains technically serviceable. Identify base value, contingent value, integration investment, downside liquidity and contractual protection. State which conclusion changes if a customer, licence, employee, supplier or mission milestone fails to transfer.

21. Value standalone capability

The central diligence issue concerns cash flows and controlled assets available without buyer-specific synergies. The evidence set should begin with mission tree, contract waterfall, unit economics, IP schedule, workforce plan and funding requirement. Successful tests, anomalies, waivers and unresolved work belong in the same record.

The required analytical output is a probability-weighted standalone enterprise value. Link each conclusion to mission probability, integration schedule, cost, funding, customer acceptance and cash collection. A technical asset has transaction value when the buyer can control, transfer, integrate and use it in an authorised mission.

For the transaction, the board should anchor price in evidence that transfers at closing. The standalone case should include only missions the target can fund and deliver with controlled resources or enforceable supply arrangements. It should exclude broad strategic narratives. Identify base value, contingent value, integration investment, downside liquidity and contractual protection. State which conclusion changes if a customer, licence, employee, supplier or mission milestone fails to transfer.

22. Value buyer-specific synergies

The central diligence issue concerns accelerated market entry, avoided development, shared launch, customer cross-sell, manufacturing scale and lower operating cost. The evidence set should begin with buyer plans, duplicative cost base, engineering estimates, customer evidence and integration schedule. Successful tests, anomalies, waivers and unresolved work belong in the same record.

The required analytical output is a synergy register with probability, timing, cost and owner. Link each conclusion to mission probability, integration schedule, cost, funding, customer acceptance and cash collection. A technical asset has transaction value when the buyer can control, transfer, integrate and use it in an authorised mission.

For the transaction, the board should pay only for synergies that are specific, executable and appropriately shared. A strategic buyer may create more value than a financial buyer by providing a bus, manufacturing capacity, licences or customers. Integration cost and execution probability belong beside every claimed synergy. Identify base value, contingent value, integration investment, downside liquidity and contractual protection. State which conclusion changes if a customer, licence, employee, supplier or mission milestone fails to transfer.

23. Construct the hypothetical value bridge

The central diligence issue concerns the movement from standalone mission value through controlled assets, customer access, synergies and deductions. The evidence set should begin with transaction-specific technical, contractual, regulatory and financial diligence. Successful tests, anomalies, waivers and unresolved work belong in the same record.

The required analytical output is USD 84 million of illustrative enterprise value. Link each conclusion to mission probability, integration schedule, cost, funding, customer acceptance and cash collection. A technical asset has transaction value when the buyer can control, transfer, integrate and use it in an authorised mission.

For the transaction, the board should show which value is paid at closing and which remains contingent. The worked case admits value for robotics, autonomy, flight data and qualified customer access. It deducts the work and risk required to combine those assets into an executable mission. Identify base value, contingent value, integration investment, downside liquidity and contractual protection. State which conclusion changes if a customer, licence, employee, supplier or mission milestone fails to transfer.

24. Design consideration and protections

The central diligence issue concerns upfront cash, shares, escrow, holdbacks, milestone payments, earn-outs, contingent value and committed funding. The evidence set should begin with value bridge, integration plan, customer consents, regulatory path and milestone definitions. Successful tests, anomalies, waivers and unresolved work belong in the same record.

The required analytical output is consideration aligned to evidence and cash delivery. Link each conclusion to mission probability, integration schedule, cost, funding, customer acceptance and cash collection. A technical asset has transaction value when the buyer can control, transfer, integrate and use it in an authorised mission.

For the transaction, the board should release uncertain value only against objective configuration, mission and collection events. Technical milestones should name the relevant configuration, environment and independent evidence. Commercial milestones should use funded scope, accepted service and collected contribution rather than announcements. Identify base value, contingent value, integration investment, downside liquidity and contractual protection. State which conclusion changes if a customer, licence, employee, supplier or mission milestone fails to transfer.

25. Plan signing-to-close execution

The central diligence issue concerns customer consent, regulatory filings, export licences, information access, employee retention, financing and interim operating covenants. The evidence set should begin with transaction timetable, conditions precedent, clean-team protocol, consent matrix and long-stop analysis. Successful tests, anomalies, waivers and unresolved work belong in the same record.

The required analytical output is a critical-path closing plan. Link each conclusion to mission probability, integration schedule, cost, funding, customer acceptance and cash collection. A technical asset has transaction value when the buyer can control, transfer, integrate and use it in an authorised mission.

For the transaction, the board should protect mission continuity while limiting value leakage and prohibited integration. Space missions can have fixed launch and customer windows. The sale process should preserve supplier orders, configuration control and mission readiness during regulatory review. Identify base value, contingent value, integration investment, downside liquidity and contractual protection. State which conclusion changes if a customer, licence, employee, supplier or mission milestone fails to transfer.

26. Govern post-close integration

The central diligence issue concerns technical baseline, mission readiness, customer commitments, regulatory compliance, cash and synergy delivery. The evidence set should begin with integration management office, configuration board, mission reviews, customer steering and finance reconciliation. Successful tests, anomalies, waivers and unresolved work belong in the same record.

The required analytical output is one evidence-led value dashboard. Link each conclusion to mission probability, integration schedule, cost, funding, customer acceptance and cash collection. A technical asset has transaction value when the buyer can control, transfer, integrate and use it in an authorised mission.

For the transaction, the board should refresh the acquisition case when mission or customer evidence changes. The board should track branch probabilities, remaining funding and customer conversion, not only activity completion. New evidence should change intervention and capital decisions. Identify base value, contingent value, integration investment, downside liquidity and contractual protection. State which conclusion changes if a customer, licence, employee, supplier or mission milestone fails to transfer.

27. Make the board decision

The central diligence issue concerns whether the complete acquired mission chain justifies price, risk allocation and capital commitment. The evidence set should begin with capability map, integration tree, contract waterfall, regulatory plan, value bridge and downside liquidity. Successful tests, anomalies, waivers and unresolved work belong in the same record.

The required analytical output is approve, reprice, restructure, defer or walk away. Link each conclusion to mission probability, integration schedule, cost, funding, customer acceptance and cash collection. A technical asset has transaction value when the buyer can control, transfer, integrate and use it in an authorised mission.

For the transaction, the board should record the evidence supporting each element of price and protection. The strongest transaction case identifies a controlled route from customer need to collected cash. Missing capability can be acceptable when its owner, cost, timing and evidence milestone are explicit and funded. Identify base value, contingent value, integration investment, downside liquidity and contractual protection. State which conclusion changes if a customer, licence, employee, supplier or mission milestone fails to transfer.

Conclusion

An in-orbit servicing acquisition should be valued as a controlled mission chain. Robotics, rendezvous autonomy and customer access can each be scarce and valuable. Each can also become stranded when the other layers, interfaces, rights, people, approvals and funding do not transfer. The buyer therefore needs a capability map, mission tree, contract waterfall, integration work breakdown and jurisdiction-specific control plan before it can assign price.

The framework places standalone value on probability-weighted mission cash and controlled transferable assets. It places buyer-specific value on evidenced acceleration, avoided development, utilisation and customer conversion. It deducts integration, regulatory, change-of-control, concentration and funding exposure. It then aligns consideration with the evidence that remains to be created after signing.

The board decision is practical. The buyer should be able to identify who controls every critical capability, what evidence supports it, what it costs to combine, which customer will pay for the first integrated mission, which authority must approve it, and how the company survives a delay or failure. If those answers are incomplete, the transaction can still proceed through a lower upfront price, committed integration funding and contingent consideration tied to objective mission and cash outcomes.

Appendix A. Acquisition evidence request

Request the transaction perimeter, cap table, board approvals, mission architecture, system requirements, interface-control documents, qualification and acceptance records, flight telemetry, anomaly and waiver logs, source-code and data repositories, intellectual-property chain of title, open-source register, supplier contracts, launch arrangements, licences, export classifications, customer contracts, memoranda, order book, invoices, collections, insurance, programme accounts, cost-to-complete, cash forecast, employee agreements and retention plan. Reconcile each item to a named capability and forecast mission.

Appendix B. Red-flag tests

Red flags include a headline contract without funded scope; a customer memorandum without mission authority; robotics described as flight qualified without target-relevant testing; autonomy code without controlled training data; interfaces owned by a supplier; intellectual property developed under restrictive funding; change-of-control consent absent; export classification incomplete; key mission knowledge held by departing personnel; integration budget omitted; launch and customer windows misaligned; and cash runway ending before the first combined mission.

Appendix C. Hypothetical transaction assumptions

The worked case assumes a strategic buyer, a target with one completed inspection mission, one funded demonstration contract, three non-binding customer memoranda, controlled rendezvous software, a robotic capture mechanism and no repeat paid servicing mission. The target requires platform integration, customer consent, regulatory review and additional capital. All values are illustrative USD millions and do not describe a named company, mandate, forecast or offer.

Appendix D. Worked-case figures and tables

Figure 1. Acquisition thesis by capability layer



Proposed separation of robotics, rendezvous and customer-access value.

Figure 2. Combined mission and integration tree



Illustrative sequence; branch probabilities require transaction evidence.

Figure 3. Capability transfer and integration heat map



Illustrative risk scoring from one to five.

Figure 4. Hypothetical acquisition value bridge



Illustrative USD millions; inputs require transaction-specific evidence.

Figure 5. Consideration aligned to evidence



Illustrative allocation of USD 84 million enterprise value.

Table 1. Capability acquisition archetypes

Archetype	Acquired value	Common missing dependency
Robotics	mechanisms, end-effectors, manipulation software and test heritage	target access, navigation and mission rights
Rendezvous autonomy	relative navigation, guidance, simulation and flight data	capture hardware, licences and customers
Customer access	contracts, procurement position and operator relationships	executable mission capability and funding
Integrated provider	combined platform, operations and customer pathway	repeat heritage, scale and working capital

Proposed separation of transaction perimeter and missing dependencies.

Table 2. Selected public programme evidence

Evidence	Public observation	Transaction relevance
NASA 2025 ISAM State of Play	11 capability areas across missions, facilities and developers	capability map and market fragmentation
GAO 2025 ISAM assessment	robotic servicing is not routine; demand, testing and regulation remain challenges	integration and adoption risk
ESA RISE	specialised robotics, sensors and autonomous docking linked to commercial service	integrated mission requirements
ESA ClearSpace-1	publicly procured capture and removal mission	customer access and mission execution
JAXA CRD2	phased demonstration from inspection toward removal	staged evidence and procurement
NASA OSAM-1	cancelled after cost, schedule, technical and transition concerns	sunk cost is not transferable value

Programme-specific records; they do not establish an unidentified target's value.

Table 3. Customer and contract waterfall

Step	Required evidence	Valuation treatment
Relationship	named contact and engagement history	strategic context only
Mission authority	operator consent and command protocol	executable-right threshold
Executed scope	signed statement of work	legal perimeter
Funded amount	appropriation, task order or non-refundable deposit	remove unfunded options
Remaining cost	integration, launch and operations estimate	deduct fulfilment cash
Acceptance	objective customer milestone	probability weight
Collection	invoice and bank receipt	realised contribution

Proposed reconciliation from relationship to collected contribution.

Table 4. Hypothetical acquisition value bridge

Step	Amount	Required evidence
Standalone probability-weighted mission value	52	mission cash and downside cases
Controlled robotics and interface IP	18	ownership, configuration and buyer use
Rendezvous software and flight data	22	rights, provenance and relevance
Qualified customer access	16	consent, funded scope and mission rights
Buyer-specific synergies	20	executable integration and sales plan
Platform and integration work	minus 17	cost, schedule and technical closure
Change-of-control and export exposure	minus 11	filings, licences and mitigation
Customer conversion risk	minus 9	binding scope and acceptance path
Remaining funding	minus 7	downside runway through first mission
Final illustrative enterprise value	84	integrated evidence set

All amounts are illustrative USD millions.

Table 5. Integration workstreams

Workstream	Core evidence	Completion trigger
Architecture	controlled interfaces and configuration	approved combined baseline
Software and data	repositories, access and validation	flight configuration accepted
Robotics	target-relevant qualification	integrated test passed
Customer	consent, scope and mission authority	binding executable order
Regulatory	filings, licences and controls	authorisation effective
People	retention and knowledge transfer	critical roles staffed
Capital	funded cost-to-complete and downside reserve	runway through acceptance

Proposed work breakdown from signing through the first combined mission.

Table 6. Transaction protections

Unresolved item	Potential protection	Release evidence
Interface compatibility	integration milestone	configuration-specific test
Customer transfer	consent condition	effective novation or order
Export and security	condition or carve-out	licence and clearance
Key-person dependency	retention escrow	service through mission review
Mission outcome	earn-out	accepted service
Commercial conversion	contingent value	collected contribution
Funding need	committed financing	downside runway funded

Proposed allocation of unresolved value and risk.

Table 7. Post-close value dashboard

Dimension	Core measure	Trigger
Technical	interfaces closed and tests passed	critical anomaly or waiver
Mission	branch probability and schedule	material probability decline
Customer	funded executable scope	consent, budget or target change
Regulatory	approvals and controlled access	delay, mitigation or breach
People	critical-role coverage	departure or knowledge gap
Capital	runway through acceptance	downside funding shortfall
Value	standalone and synergy bridge	evidence or cost movement

Proposed monthly board record.

Frequently asked questions

Q: Should a buyer acquire robotics, rendezvous autonomy or customer access first? A: The answer depends on the buyer's controlled capabilities and mission strategy. Map the complete mission chain, identify the scarcest missing layer and price only the capability that transfers and can be integrated.

Q: Does a flight-qualified robotic arm establish servicing capability? A: It establishes evidence for the tested configuration and environment. The buyer must still verify navigation, target compatibility, mission rights, operations, customer acceptance and funding.

Q: How should non-binding customer memoranda be valued? A: Treat them as pipeline evidence. Give contracted value only to executable rights supported by funded scope, customer consent, acceptance terms and credible contribution.

Q: What is the strongest evidence for rendezvous capability? A: Relevant flight telemetry, independent mission review, target-representative conditions, controlled source code and data, and a documented anomaly and configuration history provide the strongest evidence.

Q: Why can export controls affect acquisition value? A: They can restrict ownership transfer, technical-data access, staffing, software support, integration locations and customer eligibility. The transaction needs a specific classification, licence and control plan.

Q: How should buyer synergies be priced? A: Record each synergy with an owner, probability, timing, integration cost and customer evidence. Share value only when execution is specific and supported.

Q: Which transaction protections are most useful? A: Customer-consent conditions, configuration-specific integration milestones, retention arrangements, regulatory conditions, holdbacks, mission earn-outs and collected-cash contingent value can align payment with evidence.

Q: What is the central board decision? A: The board must decide whether the controlled route from customer need to accepted service and collected cash justifies the price, integration investment, regulatory exposure and downside liquidity.

References

[1] NASA Technical Reports Server, In-Space Servicing, Assembly, and Manufacturing State of Play, 2025 edition. https://ntrs.nasa.gov/citations/20250008988

[2] NASA, In-Space Servicing, Assembly, and Manufacturing. https://www.nasa.gov/isam/

[3] U.S. Government Accountability Office, In-Space Servicing, Assembly, and Manufacturing: Benefits, Challenges, and Policy Options, GAO-25-107555, 10 July 2025. https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-25-107555

[4] U.S. Government Accountability Office, GAO-25-107555 full report. https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-25-107555.pdf

[5] European Space Agency, ESA to build first in-orbit servicing mission with D-Orbit, 14 October 2024. https://www.esa.int/Space_Safety/ESA_to_build_first_in-orbit_servicing_mission_with_D-Orbit

[6] European Space Agency, ESA purchases world-first debris removal mission from start-up, 1 December 2020. https://www.esa.int/Space_Safety/ESA_purchases_world-first_debris_removal_mission_from_start-up

[7] European Space Agency, ClearSpace-1. https://www.esa.int/Space_Safety/ClearSpace-1

[8] Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency, JAXA concludes partnership-type contract for Phase II of its Commercial Removal of Debris Demonstration, 20 August 2024. https://global.jaxa.jp/press/2024/08/20240820-1_e.html

[9] Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency, CRD2 Phase I and ADRAS-J fly-around observation, 30 July 2024. https://global.jaxa.jp/press/2024/07/20240730-1_e.html

[10] NASA, On-orbit Servicing, Assembly, and Manufacturing 1. https://www.nasa.gov/mission/on-orbit-servicing-assembly-and-manufacturing-1/

[11] NASA, Robotic Servicing Mission Launches with NASA Support, 22 July 2026. https://www.nasa.gov/technology/robotic-servicing-mission-launches-with-nasa-support/

[12] NASA, Satellite Servicing Technologies Licensed by Northrop Grumman, 18 January 2022. https://www.nasa.gov/centers-and-facilities/goddard/nasa-satellite-servicing-technologies-licensed-by-northrop-grumman/

[13] NASA, Small Spacecraft Technology State of the Art: Guidance, Navigation, and Control, 2026. https://www.nasa.gov/smallsat-institute/sst-soa/guidance-navigation-and-control/

[14] NASA, Systems Engineering Handbook Appendix: Establishing Technology Readiness Levels. https://www.nasa.gov/reference/system-engineering-handbook-appendix/

[15] NASA, Systems Engineering Handbook, SP-2016-6105 Rev 2. https://www.nasa.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/nasa_systems_engineering_handbook_0.pdf

[16] U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, EAR Part 734. https://www.bis.gov/regulations/ear/734

[17] U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, EAR Part 748. https://www.bis.gov/regulations/ear/748

[18] U.S. Department of the Treasury, CFIUS guidance on information that may facilitate review. https://home.treasury.gov/faq-item/international-affairs/what-steps-though-not-required-for-a-notice-to-be-determined-complete-may-facilitate-cfiuss-review

[19] U.S. Department of the Treasury, 2024 CFIUS Annual Report. https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/206/2024-CFIUS-Annual-Report.pdf

[20] UK Government, National Security and Investment Act guidance on notifiable acquisitions: Satellite and Space Technology. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/national-security-and-investment-act-guidance-on-notifiable-acquisitions/national-security-and-investment-act-guidance-on-notifiable-acquisitions

[21] Northrop Grumman Corporation, Annual Report for the year ended 31 December 2025. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1133421/000113342126000003/noc-20251231.htm

[22] Momentus Inc., Annual Report for the year ended 31 December 2024. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1781162/000178116225000008/mnts-20241231.htm

[23] IFRS Foundation, IFRS 3 Business Combinations. https://www.ifrs.org/issued-standards/list-of-standards/ifrs-3-business-combinations/

[24] IFRS Foundation, IFRS 13 Fair Value Measurement. https://www.ifrs.org/issued-standards/list-of-standards/ifrs-13-fair-value-measurement/

[25] IFRS Foundation, IAS 38 Intangible Assets. https://www.ifrs.org/issued-standards/list-of-standards/ias-38-intangible-assets/

[26] IFRS Foundation, IAS 36 Impairment of Assets. https://www.ifrs.org/issued-standards/list-of-standards/ias-36-impairment-of-assets/

[27] International Valuation Standards Council, IVS 105 Valuation Models, 31 January 2025. https://ivsc.org/standards/

[28] United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, Guidelines for the Long-term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities, 2021. https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/oosadoc/data/documents/2021/stspace/stspace79_0.html

[29] Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee, IADC Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines, Rev 3, 2025. https://www.iadc-home.org/documents_public/file_down/id/5767

About the Author

Chennakeshav (CK) is a corporate finance and investment banking executive with 25+ years of global experience in deal origination, structuring and execution across M&A, growth capital and corporate strategy. He has led value-creation mandates for founders, corporates and funds — bridging the boardroom view to hands-on execution and closure.

His career spans Morgan Stanley, HSBC, Lloyds Banking Group, EWEC, ADQ portfolio companies and Emirates Growth Fund, across TMT, real estate, fintech, deeptech, cleantech, infrastructure and energy. He has partnered with C-suite leaders, private equity and venture funds, sovereign wealth funds and family offices to finance complex fund raises and scale-up ventures, and has led M&A due diligence, post-merger integration and business-transformation initiatives to create value.

At Matchpoint Partners, he is Managing Partner and leads the firm's corporate finance, M&A and capital-raising practice. He holds an MBA from London Business School, an engineering degree from VTU and a Master of Laws (LLM, in progress) from UCL London.

An active start-up mentor, CK mentors at Techstars, DIFC FinTech Hive, Startup Grind, Founder Institute and IN5, serves as Entrepreneur Mentor in Residence (EMiR) at London Business School, and judges the Entrepreneurship World Cup.

https://www.linkedin.com/in/ckadya/

https://www.matchpoint-partners.com/team/ck-adya.html

This paper is part of a continuing series on the structure of private and alternative markets. The views expressed are the author's own. The paper is for information only, describes market structure in general terms, and does not constitute investment, legal, tax or regulatory advice or a recommendation in respect of any security, vehicle or counterparty.